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Abstract
The use of digital X509v3 public key certificates, together with different standards
for secure digital signatures are commonly adopted to establish authentication proofs
between principals, applications and services. One of the robustness characteristics com-
monly associated with such mechanisms is the need of hardware-sealed cryptographic
devices, such as Hardware-Security Modules (or HSMs), smart cards or hardware-enabled
tokens or dongles. These devices support internal functions for management and storage
of cryptographic keys, allowing the isolated execution of cryptographic operations, with
the keys or related sensitive parameters never exposed.
The portable devices most widely used are USB-tokens (or security dongles) and inter-
nal ships of smart cards (as it is also the case of citizen cards, banking cards or ticketing
cards). More recently, a new generation of Bluetooth-enabled smart USB dongles ap-
peared, also suitable to protect cryptographic operations and digital signatures for secure
identity and payment applications. The common characteristic of such devices is to offer
the required support to be used as secure cryptographic providers. Among the advantages
of those portable cryptographic devices is also their portability and ubiquitous use, but,
in consequence, they are also frequently forgotten or even lost. USB-enabled devices im-
ply the need of readers, not always and not commonly available for generic smartphones
or users working with computing devices. Also, wireless-devices can be specialized or
require a development effort to be used as standard cryptographic providers.
An alternative to mitigate such problems is the possible adoption of conventional
Bluetooth-enabled smartphones, as ubiquitous cryptographic providers to be used, re-
motely, by client-side applications running in users’ devices, such as desktop or laptop
computers. However, the use of smartphones for safe storage and management of private
keys and sensitive parameters requires a careful analysis on the adversary model as-
sumptions. The design options to implement a practical and secure smartphone-enabled
cryptographic solution as a product, also requires the approach and the better use of
the more interesting facilities provided by frameworks, programming environments and
mobile operating systems services.
In this dissertation we addressed the design, development and experimental evalua-
tion of a secure mobile cryptographic provider, designed as a mobile service provided in
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a smartphone. The proposed solution is designed for Android-Based smartphones and
supports on-demand Bluetooth-enabled cryptographic operations, including standard
digital signatures. The addressed mobile cryptographic provider can be used by appli-
cations running on Windows-enabled computing devices, requesting digital signatures.
The solution relies on the secure storage of private keys related to X509v3 public cer-
tificates and Android-based secure elements (SEs). With the materialized solution, an
application running in a Windows computing device can request standard digital signa-
tures of documents, transparently executed remotely by the smartphone regarded as a
standard cryptographic provider.
Keywords: Public-Key Cryptography, Digital Signatures, Certificates, PKI, Cryptographic
Providers, Key Storage Providers, Bluetooth, NFC, Secure Element, HCE
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Resumo
Os certificados digitais de chave pública em formato X509v3, juntamente com os
padrões existentes para construções criptográficas de assinaturas digitais seguras, são
vulgarmente usados como mecanismos de estabelecimento de provas de autenticação
entre principais. Uma das características associada ao uso reforçado de segurança desses
mecanismos é a necessidade de se usarem dispositivos criptográficos físicos, como por
exemplo HSMs (ou Hardware-Security Modules), cartões inteligentes (ou smart cards) ou
outras soluções congéneres (como por exemplo, secure hardware-enabled tokens). Estes
dispositivos permitem gerir e armazenar chaves criptográficas ou parâmetros sensíveis
relacionados, e executar internamente as necessárias operações criptográficas, de forma
fisicamente isolada. Deste modo, as chaves criptográficas e outros segredos sensíveis
associados, nunca são expostos externamente aos dispositivos.
Entre os dispositivos portáteis mais vulgares encontram-se os USB-tokens (ou USB-
dongles), os smart cards (que são usados como cartões de identidade, como é o caso do
cartão nacional de cidadão, mas também como cartões bancários). É ainda vulgar o uso
de outros dispositivos semelhantes, tais como cartões de títulos de transporte ou usados
na área de aplicações de bilhética (ou Mobile-Ticketing).
Os anteriores dispositivos implementam de alguma forma a funcionalidade interna
de um provedor criptográfico, tendo em vista a execução segura, contida e isolada de ope-
rações criptográficas seguras, associadas ao seu uso. Mais recentemente, embora menos
vulgares, surgiram implementações especializadas de tokens ou dongles para interoperabi-
lidade via Bluetooth, de modo a evitar o uso de conexões físicas USB, de modo a poderem
ser usados de forma mais cómoda, como dispositivos móveis e ubíquos.
Entre as vantagens dos anteriores dispositivos está a sua portabilidade e ubiquidade.
No entanto, como consequência, são também frequentemente perdidos ou esquecidos.
O seu uso implica também a necessidade de leitores, nem sempre disponíveis aos uti-
lizadores de dispositivos portáteis e uso quotidiano (sejam laptops ou smartphones). Por
outro lado, muitas soluções possuem problemas de atualização de software e firmware,
com dificuldade para acompanharem a evolução de normas e padrões criptográficos.
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Uma alternativa prática para mitigar os anteriores problemas é a adoção de smartpho-
nes convencionais como dispositivos suportando provedores criptográficos, para utili-
zação como serviço para aplicações-cliente remotas executando em computadores con-
vencionais (sejam laptops ou smartphones). O uso de smartphones para armazenamento
seguro e gestão de chaves criptográficas ou parâmetros sensíveis associados, requer uma
análise cuidadosa das condições do modelo adversário, tendo ainda em vista o contexto
de comunicação móvel, sem fios. Por outro lado, a implementação para diferentes dispo-
sitivos implica a adopção das facilidades de segurança mais apropriadas, como são hoje
disponibilizadas como suporte de desenvolvimento de aplicações e serviços, ao nível das
diferentes tecnologias de sistemas operativos móveis.
A presente dissertação aborda a concepção, desenvolvimento e avaliação experimental
de um provedor criptográfico móvel, disponibilizado para smartphones Android, acessível
através de comunicação Bluetooth. O provedor implementa, de forma transparente, as
funções normalizadas de um Key Storage Provider (KSP), para utilização de aplicações
executando em sistema operativo Microsoft Windows. Na solução proposta o armazena-
mento seguro de chaves criptográficas privadas utiliza o suporte de programação para
Secure Elements (SEs), em smartphones Android.
Palavras-chave: Criptografia de Chave-Pública, Assinaturas Digitais, Certificados, PKI, Pro-
vedores Criptográficos, Provedores de armazenamento de chaves, Bluetooth, NFC, SE, HCE
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Introduction
1.1 Context and Motivation
The evolution of the digital era and the Internet leaded to a digital world where every-
one can access and navigate through the world wide web, many times interacting under
non-authenticated guarantees. In many cases, users interact as anonymous entities, and
some times we saw identity thefts of digital identities of persons, which can cause severe
damage in a person’s life. A conventional way to prove the digital identity is through
digital signatures and public-key certificates based on asymmetric cryptography [30].
Digital Signatures and Public-Key Certificates. A digital signature [72] is equiva-
lent to a traditional handwritten signature, but is more difficult to forge and can provide
non-repudiation, meaning that the person who signed cannot deny that he has signed.
Also, cannot be copied, tampered or altered. They are created using the users’ private key
and the message to sign. A digital certificate [41] contains a set of standard attributes and
values, bound to the exhibited digital identity. Those attributes are issued and typically
authenticated by a Certification Authority (CA). Then, certificates and digital signatures
can be used electronically to prove users’ identity or to validate authentication of data
and documents sent in electronic messages, assuming the validity of the CA involved.
Among the different attributes, the certificate contains the owner’s public key, which is
used by the receiver to verify digital signatures as authentication proofs of data sent by
the identity of the sender. The CA, acting as a trusted party, is responsible for issuing the
certificates, with canonical representations (such as the X509v3 standard), confirming
not only the identity of a subject but the bind of that identity to the respective public key.
The functions and operations that take place in the lifecycle management of X509v3 cer-
tificates are currently addressed by well-defined operations in a Public Key Infrastructure
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
(PKI) and following the functions and entities in the PKIX framework model [85].
For example, when signing an email (or a document) we can prove our identity by
signing the email content (or attached documents) using private keys and provide the
respective public-key certificate. Then the receiver can verify the signature. Many soft-
ware products and tools have integrated components for the management and validation
of digital signatures and X509v3 certificates (e.g, Web Browsers, Gmail service and tools,
Thunderbird Mail User Agent or Adobe Reader, among many other very common tools in
everyday use). It is also current that different entities can exhibit multiple authenticated
digital identities, each one mapped on the use of a certified public key. This happens
possibly for multiple authenticated identities that are used for different purposes, for
example, for signatures of documents with different professional roles or using different
authentication and certification policies and methods.
Protection of Private Keys. The protection of private keys is of fundamental security
importance, as this is the principal means by which the Principal is authenticated. Nowa-
days, there are two mainly ways to store a private key, as a secrecy concern [50]. In one
hand, many applications tend to store digital certificates but also the related private keys
on the hard drives of computers and in the supported file-systems, which can leave them
vulnerable to attack by hackers performing intrusion attacks. On the other hand, private
keys can be stored in persistent memory supported by specific tamper-proof physical
devices, providing more protection. By using such devices, cryptographic operations are
isolated and resistant to attack vectors against applications and operating system. This
option provides additional protection against theft or impersonation, as the user is able
to carry the private keys away from the computers and workstations. These security
hardware devices, ranging from smart cards to different variants of cryptographic tokens,
can ease the management of authentication proofs being used alongside or in the place of
passwords, to prove the user identity by secure digital signatures. This way, we can avoid
the need to manually insert credentials.
There are several types of security tokens with different objectives and approaches.
However, the most used to attend the goal of securing private keys or digital signatures
are USB tokens and smart cards [21], which are usually physically connected to comput-
ers with which the user is authenticating. For example, in Europe, each citizen have a
citizen card, supported by smart-card technology that stores a certificate including cryp-
tographic keys related to the remaining identification attributes of that citizen. Also,
some countries enable the citizen to use citizen cards or other forms of smart cards, to
sign contracts, to sign documents or to vote electronically. Other current devices, as
USB cryptographic tokens, also can be used for the same purposes. These tokens are
also currently used for authentication systems, such as Google Accounts [84] or for many
two-factor authentication solutions in the market [28].
2
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Drawbacks of hardware enabled cryptographic tokens. Hardware tokens are small
enough to be carried in a pocket or bag, facilitating their transportation and ubiquitous
use. However, these devices are also prone to losses or thefts, and also forcing users to
have them permanently, which may counteract many cases assumptions in availability
and convenience. The probability of losing tokens can be reduced in some available
technology by using additional components and services, such as alarms or notifications,
preventive locking mechanisms or body sensors detecting the absence of such devices.
The possible malicious use of stolen or lost tokens is also mitigated providing access
protection by passwords or PINs, and even biometric sensors. However, many times and
in many situations users are reluctant to carry a “yet another” hardware device, beyond
computers or smartphones. Therefore the use of software tokens for two-factor authenti-
cation procedures supported by SMS challenges or computed in applications running in
laptops or smartphones are currently adopted. This way, we avoid those drawbacks [10]
and improve commodity by reducing also the security guarantees. Another inconvenient
founded by users, is the need to use additional devices (such as smart card or token
readers) which involves biggest annoyance and more related costs.
In addition, past literature already revealed some vulnerabilities in the above devices.
Bardou et al [13] successfully discovered a method to extract the private key from several
Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #11 cryptographic devices. Also, firmware
vulnerabilities can pose huge risk to USB device security as this could allow tokens to be
reprogrammed to steal the contents of anything written to the drives and spread mali-
cious code to any computer [5]. Although, security tokens are external devices connected
to our computers, they are used to authenticate users may times trough untrusted access
networks, being vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks [48], requiring the
complementary support of secure communication channels. Once the computer is com-
promised, it is possible to manipulate the interoperability with the token, as well as the
client-side software, accessing to token functions. Even if the token device firmware is
initially correct, it can be also potentially overwritten without the user’s knowledge. In
this situation, the user may unwittingly connect the device to additional systems, which
can be subsequently compromised.
Flexible solutions for private-keys and cryptographic protection. A more flexible
and versatile solution to avoid the discussed drawbacks, and to achieve security condi-
tions for management of digital certificates and private keys, can be the use of smart-
phones. The idea is to provide such requirements with an object that we carry daily
and we use regularly to do multiple tasks in our daily life [25]. As in token-devices,
smartphones can also be lost and stolen, but the risk is lower: they are in general under
a more permanent surveillance of users, used as ubiquitous supervised devices. Smart-
phones are also bigger than USB tokens for example, and most of the time they are close
to users. Current technology also allows for the device access protection by passwords
or PINs, locking-prevention after a reduced number of unsuccessful attempts. Current
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smartphones also allow for the possible combination of access-control mechanisms using
secret patterns as answers to cognitive challenges, biometric fingerprints, but also, native
sensor-based data or voice-recognition patterns. Existing solutions for the certificate us-
age in today’s smartphones already involve their correct installation under verification
guarantees from the device OS (e.g, Android OS framework libraries), and the use of in-
stalled certificates for any supported application. For storing private keys and verifiable
access to valid and correct certificates, mobile storage options include: the smartphone
hard flash-disks; SD cards; Secure Element (SE) and related hardware chips, ARM Trust-
Zone technology levered by the ARM processor and Host Card Emulation (HCE) software
facilities and design patterns [24].
The flexibility of using smartphones for the management of certificates and private
keys came from the potential use of such devices to implement cryptographic operations,
particularly digital signatures. A possible idea is to use such devices as mobile crypto-
graphic providers, accessible by wireless Bluetooth (or Bluetooth Low Energy), as well as,
Near Field Communication (NFC) channels. This allows the use of their cryptographic
functions, on demand, by different users’ devices and applications, namely running on
laptops or desktops. However, the approach to implement this idea must be aware of the
possible vulnerabilities too, such as the ones pointed out by Entrust [92]. These include
SMS-based attacks that can redirect SMS to exploit Android-based mobile devices for
illegal financial gain or malicious users’ attempts to clone properly secured applications
to another device. Additionally, many other threats in the mobile execution environment
can be found in literature, as well as, security concerns in protecting communication end-
points for Bluetooth and Bluetooth-enabled Security Operation [19, 26, 36, 51, 59, 67, 87,
88, 93] or NFC channels [3, 15, 27, 70, 73, 91], depending on the adopted communication
technology to materialize the above idea.
1.2 Objectives, Contributions and Validation
The present dissertation addresses the design, implementation and experimental eval-
uation of a mobile cryptographic provider for Android smartphones, used to manage,
store and execute digital signatures for external devices, namely Microsoft Windows com-
puters. The approach of such a solution aims to study technical solutions that increase
the security of Bluetooth connections to support the communication of cryptographic
operations between Windows-based applications and the smartphone used as the mobile
cryptographic provider. In our solution the mobile device is used to store and manage
X509v3 certificates and cryptographic keys, providing its services to Windows-based
applications, in a transparent way. For transparency criteria, the idea is that the mobile
cryptographic provider must be used by Windows-based applications, in a similar way as
using a local-installed crypto provider. Included in the dissertation objectives, security
guarantees must be provided for integrity, authentication and authorization properties,
in accessing the functions offered by the Android-enabled mobile cryptographic provider.
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Some challenges arise with the dissertation goal. The major ones are the security of
the communication channel and the secure management of certificates and private keys
on the smartphone. The ability of the solution to be integrated in the Android framework
by using the design options for Android Secure Elements (SEs)) in the Android Program-
ming Framework, is another important concern.
In order to build the proposed solution, the following contributions were addressed:
• Analysis of the security properties of currently-enabled Bluetooth secure chan-
nels using the more recent standardized security modes and the required security
enforcements. As such, we can protect the communication between the crypto
provider hosted on the computer (client-side) and the crypto provider running in
the smartphone environment (server-side).;
• Analysis of Android-based storage solutions to manage X509v3 certificates and
secure solutions for the protection of private keys and security-associations with
the stored certificates;
• Design of software attestation guarantees for the crypto provider solution running
in the Android smartphone, with protection provided according to the Android SEs
specification and development guidelines;
• Development of the crypto provider solution as an Android service running under
the SE model;
• Design and development of a Windows crypto provider (more precisely, a Key Stor-
age Provider), that virtually communicates by Bluetooth with the Android crypto
provider service;
• Support for certificate registration and cryptographic operations, particularly, stan-
dardized digital signatures in the Windows OS environment (client-side), executed
in the remote crypto provider (server-side).
From the system model and software architecture in the design solution, we imple-
mented a prototype, addressed as a pre-product approach and funded initiative, in part-
nership between the FCT/UNL and NOVA-LINCS Research Center and Multicert S.A.
With the developed prototype we conducted an experimental evaluation with different
assessment criteria, to validate the proposed solution, including:
• Validity testing on the transparency of the provided solution when used by Windows-
based applications, selecting Adobe Acrobat and Microsoft Word and Outlook as
targeted applications;
• A test bench for performance evaluation of digital signatures provided by the de-
signed and implemented Android mobile cryptographic provider. Measuring the
5
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
latency conditions observed by Windows-based applications and understanding the
components contributing to latency and operation throughput metrics;
• Performance analysis in the operation of the Bluetooth-enabled communication
channel in the solution, to observe the overheads imposed by the security require-
ments and their support;
• Additional experimental observations on the implemented mobile cryptographic
provider solution, including: packaging metrics; runtime instrumentation and im-
pact on resources allocation; as well as, power consumption observations.
1.3 Document Organization
This dissertation report is organized in six chapters including the current one. In Chapter
2, is presented the dissertation related work and state-of-the-art, which includes the ap-
proaches to secure the communication channel, the techniques to storage and manage pri-
vate keys and the Windows Crypto Provider APIs. Chapter 3 discusses the system model
and architecture, and its components for our proposed mobile crypto provider. Chapter
4 presents the prototype of the proposed solution. In Chapter 5, it is presented the ex-
perimental assessment to validate our proposal and implemented prototype. Finally, in
Chapter 6, we summarize the main conclusions and possible future work directions from
the implementation and observed results in this dissertation.
6
C
h
a
p
t
e
r
2
Background and Related Work
In this chapter we address different state-of-the-art approaches to accomplish the objec-
tives presented in the previous chapter. The two first Sections (2.1 and 2.2) present the
possible solutions founded in literature to our main goals: communication channel and
private key storage security. These include Near Field Communication (NFC) and Blue-
tooth to secure the wireless channel and Host Card Emulation (HCE) and Secure Element
(SE) to store the private key securely. Then, in Section 2.3, we study the available APIs
used to provide access to Windows cryptographic providers. Finally, in Section 2.4, we
present a critical analysis about the related work techniques discussed and also how we
handle their limitations and drawbacks in order to achieve our objectives.
2.1 NFC and Bluetooth Security
Multiple wireless network solutions are available to handle the communication between
a computer and a smartphone such as Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), or
Wi-Fi [57, 68]. In this dissertation, the goal is to establish a wireless communication
channel without using Internet and that is effectively secure for transmitting sensitive
data across it, i.e, is protected against malicious users. Thus, in this section we will
discuss the Bluetooth and NFC approaches, indicating for each the existing threats and
protection techniques.
2.1.1 Near Field Communication
NFC is a high frequency wireless communication technology which enables the exchange
of data between devices under a 10 centimeter distance [27]. Is based on the "touching
paradigm", which means approximating two NFC-enabled devices close to each other
or simply touching to enable communications between them. This paradigm was firstly
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employed by the Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology [45] that consists in a
microchip (called RFID tag) attached to an antenna in a package that resembles a sticker
used for identifying an object or a person. The data transmission between a RFID tag
and a RFID reader is done via magnetic field induction. NFC-enabled devices also have
integrated and are based on this technology.
With NFC users can perform safe and contactless transactions, access digital services
or transfer a file from one device to another. Other great innovation is that credit cards
or tickets can be integrated into the mobile phones, avoiding the need to physically carry
them elsewhere we go [4]. At the same time, NFC can assure the secure storage of personal
information, like private keys, and the storage and execution of NFC-based applications
(e.g, card applications) through the hardware-based secure element (Section 2.2.1) of
mobile phones. However, with HCE technology (Section 2.2.2), emerged the possibility
of having virtual card applications running on the mobile phone’s operating system.
According to ECMA-340 standard [64], NFC enables the establishment of bidirec-
tional communication channels. In one side, we have a Initiator device that initiates and
manages the interaction process. At the other side, we have a Target device that only
responds to the Initiator’s requests. NFC protocol specifies that the communication can
happen in two modes, a mode where the Initiator and Target device generate their own
radio frequency field to transmit the data and a mode where only the Initiator device cre-
ates the radio frequency field, respectively, Active Mode and Passive Mode. In addition,
there are three operating modes for device communication [27], which are Reader/Writer
(R/W), Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Card Emulation. In R/W, data is transferred between
a mobile and a tag; in P2P, data is transferred between two mobiles (or devices); and
in Card-emulation, the data is transferred between a mobile and a reader. Besides the
standardization of these modes, NFC data messages are also standardized by the NFC
Forum [27] as NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF) messages [37].
2.1.1.1 NFC Threats and Protection
Due to the proximity paradigm, attackers will encounter difficulties in attacking the data
packets since the channel is very short. However, it does not ensure complete system
security and user privacy [27, 70, 73]. The attacks can be directed to the NFC ecosystem
or to a particular NFC component (i.e, a tag, a reader or a mobile phone).
NFC tags contains sensitive data that attackers can manipulate by replacing with
malicious data, hiding the original tag with a fake tag or cloning the tag. Typical attacks
include infecting the mobile phones with hidden NFC worms, phishing and spoofing
attacks which provides the users with data that looks valid but in reality are fake, or NFC
attacks using empty tags that cause a reaction on the device. A general solution to protect
the tags is integrating digital signatures on NDEF messages to provide data integrity and
authentication. [27, 75]. However, some vulnerabilities on the signature record types
were discovered in another study [76], where some countermeasures to handle them were
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discussed. Recent studies, propose to provide confidentiality to NDEF messages [40].
Despite the advantage of generating a short-range link, the NFC communications can
be target of a variety of attacks due to devices interacting using radio frequency waves.
The distance from which an attacker is able to make an attack can be extremely close
depending on several factors [73]. Generally, the attack surface is composed by eavesdrop-
ping, Denial of Service (DoS), Man-In-The-Middle (MITM), relay and phishing attacks.
Also, data modification and corruption is possible, for example, via RFID jammers [73].
In the case of eavesdropping, the attack success depends on the communication mode:
if Active Mode is used, the attack can be done in less than 10 meters; otherwise, is very
difficult to achieve eavesdropping. However, countermeasures for some of these threats
already exist. For example, to protect NFC from eavesdropping and prevent data manip-
ulation, the solution is to create a secure channel between devices using a key agreement
protocol (e.g, Diffie-Hellman (DH) based on RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
algorithms). In the case of MITM attacks, no countermeasure exists, because Passive
and Active Modes implicitly protect the communications making these attacks almost
impossible to happen, although it may happen in specific contexts.
NFC Readers are more sensitive to physical attacks, due to its placement in public
areas, where they can being stolen, destructed or removed, but can also be target of
software attacks given the critical information (e.g, cryptographic keys) they store.
Several NFC security standards have been developed in the past few years with the aim
of providing a reliable basis for accessing NFC services and applications securely [43].
NFCIP-1 standard was the first to define a security protocol focused only on the data
exchanged between two NFC mobiles (i.e, P2P mode). On top of that standardization, a
new security standard (called NFC-SEC or ECMA-385) was built to improve the security
capabilities [65]. This standard is defined as a common framework upon which future
cryptography standards with more advanced security features can be implemented [43].
These standards can effectively deal with security threats, such as eavesdropping, data
manipulation and MITM attacks, in order to guarantee the protection of NFC connections
and the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data transmission [43].
2.1.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth is an open standard for short-range radio frequency communication technology
suitable to replace cables on devices like keyboards, mouses or printers [68]. This allows
users to create an ad hoc network between devices to transfer data, called Piconet, which
is a set of two or more Bluetooth-enabled devices close to each other operating in the same
channel using the same frequency. Bluetooth technology is used in many business areas
and consumer devices such as mobile phones, computers, headsets and watches. Benefits
include disuse of extra gadgets to connect devices, automatic wireless synchronization
between devices, non-proximity demand and ease of file sharing [67]. This technology has
multiple versions and has two major implementations families standardized by the IEEE
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802.15.1 [89]: Bluetooth Classic, which includes Bluetooth Basic Rate (BR), Enhanced
Data Rate (EDR) and High Speed (HS), and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE).
Bluetooth devices can operate with multiple data rates and change the Media Access
Control (MAC) address and physical (PHY) layers. BR is the first Bluetooth version (v1.x
series) and only supports transmission speeds of up to 1 megabit per second (Mbps). With
version 2.0 + EDR, data rates in the order of 3 Mbps were reached, and Bluetooth EDR was
born. In version 3.0 + HS, devices operate at higher data rates, up to 24 Mbps, by using
alternative MAC/PHYs (AMP). This is known as Bluetooth HS. Nowadays, these several
Bluetooth versions are used by commercial devices and all of them support backward
compatibility. This means that older versions with low data rates are supported in later
versions with higher data rates.
BLE [38], also called Bluetooth Smart, was introduced in the Bluetooth v4.0 spec-
ification with the intent of improving the energy consumption of mobile phones and,
consequently, the throughput. Despite this, BLE also have other important goals, in-
cluding reduced memory requirements, efficient discovery and connection procedures,
short packet lengths and simple protocols and services. This standard is widely used for
wireless BLE solutions, such as battery-powered sensors and devices.
Comparing with available versions, the adoption of Bluetooth v5.0 will be consid-
ered in the implementation baseline, although most devices use (and are optimized) for
Bluetooth v4.x series. Bluetooth v5.0 primary goal is to provide enhancements related
with range, data transfer speed, broadcast capacity and energy consumption, with BLE
implementations emerging as the choice solution for Internet of Things (IoT) [22]. Al-
though, even that BLE specification is the distinctive feature for such case, the Bluetooth
Classic continues to be provided alongside, offering the devices concurrent support for
both implementations.
2.1.2.1 Bluetooth Security
Bluetooth Security Architecture. This is illustrated in figure 2.1, which involves the
participation of Bluetooth protocols to enforce the Bluetooth security policies such as
Link Manager Protocol (LMP), Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP)
and Radio Frequency Communication (RFCOMM) protocol. Link Manager participates
in security procedures depending on the Bluetooth Security Mode: only the safest mode
implies Link Manager to implement security [59]. L2CAP is a logical link and manages
the creation and termination of virtual connections, called channels, with other devices.
It also negotiates and determines security parameters for link establishment. RFCOMM
enforces security policy for dial-up networking and other services relying on a serial port.
The key component in the architecture is the Security Manager with functions as: storage
of security-related information on devices and services; grant or refuse access requests
by protocol implementations, such as L2CAP, RFCOMM, and applications; command the
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Link Manager to enforce authentication and/or encryption before connecting to applica-
tion; and initiates setting up “trusted” pairings and asks for PIN codes from users [88].
Figure 2.1: Bluetooth Security Architecture (taken from [88]).
Bluetooth Security Modes. Bluetooth standard [19] specifies four security modes
in which a device can operate. These Security Mode indicate when a Bluetooth device
initiates security procedures (e.g, authentication and encryption), not whether it supports
security features [67]. In Security Mode 1, any security procedure are never initiated and
devices do not prevent other devices from establishing connections. Security Mode 2
is a service level enforced security mode, where security procedures are initiated after
physical and logical link setup. Security Mode 3 is a link level enforced security mode, in
which is required that security services must be performed before any attempt to connect
to other devices. That is, a device initiates security procedures, before the physical link
is fully established. For Modes 1, 2 and 3, all v2.0 and earlier devices can support it, but
v2.1 and later devices can only support it for backward compatibility. Security Mode 4
is service-based as Security Mode 2, in which encryption for all services except service
discovery is required. This mode is mandatory for communications between v2.1 and later
BR/EDR devices. However, for communications involving devices with no support for
Security Mode 4, the Security Mode used can be reduced by backward-compatibility [67].
In addition, Bluetooth allows different levels of trust and service security [67]. A
trusted device is a device authenticated to another device and has full access to all services.
An untrusted device does not have a relationship with another device and has restricted
access to services, although can be authenticated. In the other hand, three levels of
service security are allowed (in Security Mode 2): services that require authentication and
authorization; that require authentication only; and that are open to all devices. Security
Mode 4 specifies multiple levels to classify the security requirements for services.
Each Bluetooth BR/EDR security mode also determines what stage of connection pro-
vides the related security properties and how [19]. In Bluetooth security exists six possible
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security stages. Inquiry: a device in a new environment starts an inquiry to discover new
devices. Paging: is a baseband procedure invoked by a device to synchronize with one of
the responding devices. Link establishment: Link Manager executes its protocol (LMP)
to establish a link with the other device. If Security Mode 3 is enabled, then Pairing
begins in this stage. Service Discovery: LMP uses the Service Discovery Protocol (SDP)
to find the available services. L2CAP channel creation: with information obtained from
SDP, a L2CAP channel is created, which can be used by the application or the RFCOMM
protocol. Pairing is the last stage if devices operate in Security Mode 2.
Bluetooth Security Features. Both Bluetooth specification families define a variety of
security features, which are responsible for covering the encryption, trust, data integrity
and privacy of the user’s data, assuring the security and protection of the communication
channel. This security mechanisms work differently in each implementation, but with
the Bluetooth v4.1 and v4.2 releases, those differences have been minimized. The biggest
feature is the Pairing mechanism (also called as link key generation), which is the process
where the devices involved in the connection exchange their identity information to gain
trust with each other and get the encryption keys ready for the future data exchange.
However, this process differs between implementations [67]. Bluetooth BR/EDR estab-
lishes a link key by key agreement and BLE generates four different keys (Short Term Key
(STK), Long Term Key (LTK), Identity Resolving Key (IRK) and Connection Signature
Resolving Key (CSRK)) using a key transport protocol. All these keys will be essential to
other security procedures, namely the link key (or the LTK), which dominates the secu-
rity of Bluetooth, because these procedures will depend on it to accomplish their security
goals. Figure 2.2 presents the BLE pairing process including the two possible pairing
methods in phase 2 and the multiple keys distributed in phase 3.
Figure 2.2: Bluetooth Low Energy Pairing Phases (taken from [19]).
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Hence, the Bluetooth standard offers five basic security services: authentication, confi-
dentiality, authorization, integrity and pairing. But, does not address other security prop-
erties such as non-repudiation or audit [67]. The authentication mechanism provided by
Bluetooth is a process were devices are validated by a challenge-response protocol that
verifies the knowledge of the link key. One-way and mutual authentication are both possi-
ble [67]. The security of this process is based on the secrecy of the link keys, which should
never leave the device. Bluetooth provides a encryption feature to protect the data (or
messages) exchanged through the communication channel against eavesdropping attacks.
This confidentiality service is composed by three encryption Modes [67]: Encryption
Mode 1 consists in not applying any encryption on the packets that contain the data; in
Encryption Mode 2, data packets sent to individual devices are encrypted via encryption
keys derived from link keys, but packets sent to multiple devices (i.e, broadcasting) are
not encrypted; and Encryption Mode 3 is a generalization of the second mode. Yet, this
procedure derives the encryption key from an artifact of the authentication procedure,
so encryption cannot be done without authentication. In addition, authorization is the
service that determines if a device had previously been authorized as a trusted device.
Although, a device can pass authentication successfully, it could not be authorized to
access restricted services.
Security Features in Bluetooth BR/EDR (Classic). The Bluetooth Core security ar-
chitecture has evolved over time and has been specified in the different versions [19]. In
early Bluetooth BR devices, pairing were performed via a method called PIN Pairing (or
Legacy Pairing) for Security Modes 2 and 3. In Bluetooth v2.1 + EDR, the Security Mode 4
was introduced, defining a new pairing model called Secure Simple Pairing (SSP), which
utilizes Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement for link key generation [87].
SSP also provides association models to simplify the pairing process, i.e, pairing methods
that improve the flexibility in terms of device input/outputs - such as Numeric Compari-
son, Passkey Entry, Just Works and Out of Band [87]. In Bluetooth v3.0 + HS, another link
key generation method was introduced. A new key, named AMP link key, is generated
from a link key previously created (concatenated with itself) plus a ASCII key identifier.
This process is done by the AMP Manager in the host layer of the Bluetooth protocol
stack [67]. Bluetooth v4.0 do not present new significant improvements in the Bluetooth
Classic security services already provided by older versions [19]. Bluetooth v4.1 improved
the strengths of the BR/EDR technology cryptographic key, device authentication, and
encryption by making use of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)-approved
algorithms [67]. More precisely, was introduced the feature Secure Connections, which
consists in the use of P-256 Elliptic Curve (in SSP), HMAC-SHA-256 and AES-CCM al-
gorithms for link key generation, authentication and encryption, respectively. Bluetooth
v4.2 provided means to convert BR/EDR keys to Low Energy (LE) keys and vice versa.
Security Features in Bluetooth Low Energy. In the other hand, BLE offers security
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services that are also expressed in terms of two security modes, called LE Security Mode 1
and LE Security Mode 2, which have multiple levels each one. Security Mode 1 has levels
associated with encryption and authentication and Security Mode 2 has levels associated
with data signing and authentication. BLE supports the ability to send authenticated data
over an unencrypted link from one device to another based on a trusted relationship and
still granting security [19]. This is achieved with Data Signing, which consists in signing
data packets with the CSRK. Encryption uses AES-CCM cryptography to provide confi-
dentiality, authentication and integrity. Then, there is no need to do challenge/response
authentication, because LTK is used as input for the encryption key generation process,
which implicitly grants authentication. However, Data Signing provides integrity and
implicit authentication (i.e, devices have the correct CSRK), but does not provide confi-
dentiality. In addition, BLE has integrated a mechanism called LE Privacy, which consists
in mitigating the threat by which an adversary can track a BLE device by changing the
device address frequently [94]. The mobile phone MAC address will be replaced by a ran-
dom value (i.e, randomized MAC address) that changes periodically according to a timer
implemented in the device firmware by the manufacturer. These randomly generated
addresses are also called private addresses. Thus, any attacker would not be able to know
that the several different addresses correspond to the same physical device and will not
be possible to track your device. Only a trusted device that has been provided with the
corresponding encryption key (IRK) can resolve the private addresses.
In Bluetooth LE devices before v4.2, the pairing process uses SSP (referred as LE
Legacy Pairing after v4.2). However, no eavesdropping protection is provided unlike
BR/EDR, because the LE association models operate in a different way and the pairing
process itself is different, hence Just Works and Passkey Entry methods do not provide
any protection [19]. However, with the release of the Bluetooth v4.2, security is highly
enhanced and a new LE pairing model arises, named LE Secure Connections [19], which
upgrades the LE pairing to utilize FIPS-approved algorithms (i.e, ECDH public key cryp-
tography for key exchange) and adapts the Numeric Comparison association model to be
used on BLE. With ECDH cryptography, eavesdropping attacks can be mitigated, given
it’s high degree of strength against those attacks [19]. Using Numeric Comparison, pro-
tection against MITM attacks is obtained as well as using the Out of Band or Passkey
Entry methods [19]. Bluetooth v5.0 only introduces performance improvements related
BLE while all security mechanisms implemented are inherited from v4.2 [19].
2.1.2.2 Threats and Protection
Bluetooth has multiple weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that can be later exploited
by attackers such as encryption key lengths restricted by the device that has shorter
maximum length, PINs being easily brute-forced, Just Works model fragility, backward
compatibility forcing the reduction of the Security Mode and no user-authentication sup-
port [26, 36]. Regarding BLE, Passkey Entry-based and LE Legacy pairing are considered
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unsecure. Thus, Bluetooth is vulnerable to Bluejacking, Bluesnarfing, Bluebugging, MAC
Spoofing or MITM attacks [67] and more verified attacks are enumerated in literature [36,
51, 60]. The main threats related with BLE concretely are passive eavesdropping, MITM
attacks and identity tracking [19]. One important factor when discussing Bluetooth vul-
nerabilities is the version currently being used since many of them are specific to early
versions [26, 67] and almost all of them mitigated in the last versions. Also, some vul-
nerabilities could still appear while using the built-in security features. Therefore, we
need to put extra efforts to protect the Bluetooth channel and secure the user data against
future attackers [68].
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [67] recommends several coun-
termeasures based on the built-in security features in response to the threats presented.
At a educational level, a users must have an adequate level of knowledge and under-
standing about Bluetooth devices and the organizations should establish security policies
related with the use of Bluetooth devices and user’s responsibilities. Also, organizations
should reduce the risks against their Bluetooth implementations by applying methods to
handle specific threats.
At a technical level, recommendations can include changing the default settings of
the Bluetooth device to reflect the organization’s security policy and setting the Bluetooth
devices to the lowest power level so that transmissions remain within the secure perime-
ter of the organization. Using SSP with Just Works association model must be avoided,
because it does not provide MITM protection (other model is preferred). Always use link
encryption for all Bluetooth connections and with the key sizes configured to the maxi-
mum allowable (128-bit), otherwise, transmitted data are vulnerable to eavesdropping
and brute force attacks. Employ mutual authentication for all connections to verify that
all participates are legitimate. Ensure a secure environment to perform pairing where
attackers cannot capture the data packets, since it is a vital security feature and requires
that users are aware of possible eavesdroppers. Apply software and firmware patches
and upgrades regularly, because new vulnerabilities can be discovered in some vendor
products and they should be patched to prevent malicious exploits. Ensure that Blue-
tooth portable devices are configured with a password - such as a pattern, a fingerprint
or a code - to prevent unauthorized access if the devices are lost or stolen. Also, antivirus
should be installed to ensure that malware is not introduced in the Bluetooth connections.
In relation to Security Modes and levels, Bluetooth Classic devices should use Security
Mode 4 Level 4 as it requires Secure Connections and provides the highest security avail-
able for v4.1 and later Bluetooth Classic devices. If not possible, Security Mode 3 should
be the replacement. LE and v4.2 devices should use LE Security Mode 1 Level 4 as it
implements LE Secure Connections and also provides the highest security available [67].
At application-level, NIST [67] recommends to re-encrypt the data before giving
it to the Bluetooth layer and when is received by other device, it should be decrypted.
One drawback of this technique is the time and computational power needed, since the
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transmission will take longer than without encryption and a double encryption will be
quite costly depending the algorithm used. We can also apply the same procedure for
authentication, i.e, Bluetooth-independent re-authentication. Every time a user wants to
access a secure service, re-authentication can be required, which is a repetitive process.
However, fingerprint scanner can be used to ease the process. This type of mechanisms
avoids attacks such as Bluebugging and provides user-authentication.
Many other protection methods can be found in literature [7, 26, 51, 60]. For example,
Mutchukota et al. [60] proposes a improvement to the existing SSP method based on
anti-jamming techniques despite the existing solutions for MITM protection.
2.2 Secure Elements and Host Card Emulation
Secure storage is fundamental when managing keys for cryptographic operations. Mul-
tiple techniques exist to achieve this goal which ensures integrity and confidentiality of
data and enables a trusted environment to execute these operations. The most common
are Mobile Trusted Module (MTM), Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) (e.g, ARM
TrustZone technology leveraged by the ARM processor), Secure Element (SE) and Host
Card Emulation (HCE) [24]. However, only the last two are in the scope of this disserta-
tion.
2.2.1 Secure Element
SE is a tamper-resistant chip where critical code can execute and cryptographic keys can
be stored [24, 77]. This component is based on the chip design that was built for use in
contactless credit cards (e.g, smart cards) and provides the user with a level of security
and identity management to assure the safe delivery of a specific service. The information
stored in this special chip is impossible to read or copy by normal applications installed
on the device, only special and trusted applications (e.g, virtual wallets [74]) are enable
to do it. Also, SE communicates directly with end-applications without passing data
to the smartphone operative system. Therefore, if a malware infects the device, the SE
will be intact and no information can be intercepted by attackers. The main way to
implement a SE is trough hardware [90]: embedded on the smartphone hardware at the
time of manufacturing; or implemented in a removable card format (UUIC/SIM-card or
SD-card), providing a secure environment for applications to execute.
Having a SE-based security architecture eliminates the vulnerabilities of single factor
based authentication systems by adding another layer of security [81]. PKI is the best
possible authentication method, but only if the certificates and keys are stored in the SE,
because storing them out of the SE component makes them vulnerable to attacks.
Given the NFC lack of secure ways to store users’ sensitive information (e.g, bank
account details) in the mobile environment where other applications are running too,
NFC begun to use SE and designed it to be the security base of NFC technology. In this
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solution, SE is embedded together with NFC controller and can be accessed by internal
(i.e, operative system applications) as well as external applications (e.g, NFC reader) [9].
One big drawback of SE is the tight control that mobile operators and manufacturers
exercise over them [90]. This means that mobile developers that wish to access the SE to
accomplish application requirements have no permission to do it. Another problem is
that not all the devices have SEs and the use of UUIC-based SEs or their integration on
mobile phones can bring extra costs to mobile builders and, consequently, to users.
2.2.1.1 Threats and Protection
Despite being safe and secure by themselves, using SEs alongside with NFC-enabled
smartphones can cause the appearance of some threats as discussed by Roland et al. [77].
This paper presents two practical attack scenarios against a SE, given the risks imposed
by the possibility of installing untrusted mobile applications and the mobile phone con-
nectivity to a global network. These attacks are based on the assumption of unrestricted
access to the SE. The first attack is a DoS on NFC-enabled mobile phones, in which succes-
sive authentication attempts are done for card management until it is no longer available.
Then, a Relay attack is presented, in which an application is remotely installed in the
victim’s mobile phone without his knowledge and relays the communications between
the victim’s SE and mobile phone across a network to a card emulator (hosted in another
device) that can then be used as if the victim’s SE was implemented into it.
SE has strong countermeasures and is robust to a wide range of sophisticated attacks.
As consequence, a few number of successfully attacks were registered in literature [82].
However, specific mechanisms must be employed to ensure this high level of security.
The first line of defence to protect a SE is to restrict the access to it, employing access
control policies. Almost all the devices that use a SE already implement this via SE APIs
(as seen before). Cooijmans in [24] discussed that existing APIs to access SE in Android
devices only grant access to them through special permissions only granted by a root user
or the device manufacturer himself. Normal applications with basic permissions can’t
request access to the SE. The SE security can be also enhanced by combining it with a
TEE [33], which can filter the access between the operating system and the SE to allow
only trusted applications to access the SE, and uses well defined certification schemes
to reduce the risk of fraud and malicious operations [82]. Despite the threats verified
in the past, nowadays, using a embedded SE in combination with a NFC controller or a
Bluetooth driver can be very useful for control and prevent remote relay attacks [9].
2.2.2 Host Card Emulation
HCE is a contactless technology that allows the launching of mobile NFC services and
products without making use of SE by allowing the mobile device operating system (i.e,
the "host") to communicate directly over the NFC interface in Card Emulation Mode [9].
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HCE enables software emulation of card-based applications and to perform payment
transactions when the users’ sensitive informations is stored out of the SE. With HCE, no
smart-card chip is required, because applications are held in the operative system and
HCE relies on the mobile phone CPU for processing. Figure 2.3 illustrates the difference
between using SE and HCE in a NFC-based application.
Secure Element Host Card Emulation
Host CPU
NFC  
Controller
Secure  
Element
NFC Reader
Host CPU
NFC  
Controller
Secure  
Element
NFC Reader
Android Device Android Device
Figure 2.3: NFC Communications using SE and HCE (based from [9]).
In the SE-approach, the NFC controller routes all the messages from the NFC reader
to the corresponding application residing in the SE. In the HCE-approach, messages can
additionally be routed to an application running on the host CPU. The operating system
is who decides where the messages go, which could be to the SE, but are more likely to be
routed to the host. Besides this difference, HCE service can store the sensitive information
used by in a location different from the application itself and from other secure locations
such as TEE or SE. This new location can be a back-end server in the cloud from where is
possible to retrieve data when devices need to communicate [9]. Unfortunately, network
latency can cause a poor user experience, making this option not so good.
However, NFC Card Emulation services on the SE and in the host can coexist in the
same mobile phone, but is necessary to integrate a mechanism to determine where to
route the messages received from the NFC external reader [9, 29]. This mechanism allows
the NFC controller to implement a routing table that lists the NFC applications stored in
the SE and is used to choose where to forward the messages.
HCE is a benefit for the whole NFC ecosystem, since developers will be capable of
developing innovative applications, creating new NFC use cases and enhancing the NFC
service experience of the users. Another benefit is that companies that wish to deploy a
NFC mobile product don’t need to cooperate with mobile operators and manufacturers to
implement a secure environment for storage and execution that implies extra costs [90].
2.2.2.1 Threats and Protection
The change on storage location of sensitive user data and on the routing of communica-
tions when using a HCE-based applications can introduce new vulnerabilities, because
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an application running on the operating system is much more exposed to attacks than
an application executing in the SE [9]. The communications between the host and the
NFC controller can be attacked by malicious applications that live in the same ecosystem.
The threats composing the adversary model can include malware able to exploit, root or
jailbreak the device; spoofing attacks to induce users to do actions; attacks against the
cloud storage if the credentials stored in applications are compromised; or DoS attacks.
The Smart Card Alliance white paper [9] enumerates various countermeasures to
enhance the security of HCE. One technique to secure the applications can be the addition
of software security in order to make it harder for an attacker to modify the software.
Usually, this is accomplished with runtime integrity checking. If an attack is detected,
the tamper-proofed system stops the application and communicates the occurrence.
An ascending technique in the recent years is the use of biometric factors - such as
fingerprint, voice and face recognition - in addition to other authentication methods to
enforce user authentication, providing a very friendly experience for the user.
HCE-based applications can use the TEE [33], which is a secure area in the main
processor of a mobile phone that supports safe execution of trusted applications and
enables the processing and storage of data. TEE offers protection against attacks coming
from the main operating system, assists in the access control and hosts applications that
need to be isolated from the main operating system. Other benefit of TEE is that it runs in
its own operating system, hence it is not affected if the main operating system is attacked.
Methods for encrypting the data transmitted are also recommended. Data used by
HCE-based applications can be encrypted and stored within the applications. End-to-End
Encryption (E2EE) or Point-to-Point Encryption (P2PE) can be employed to ensure data
encryption at the reader and protection while the data is being transmitted.
Another simple but effective method is tokenization, which consist in replacing cre-
dentials with high intrinsic value (e.g, a finance number) for a random value with no
apparent value but equivalent. This method is typically used for masking a card identity.
2.3 Windows Cryptographic Providers
Cryptographic providers are the main way for implementing cryptographic functional-
ities in an operating system, which include cryptographic algorithms, key storage and
generation and authentication of users. Microsoft Windows operating system provides
two cryptographic APIs with which these providers are associated, Cryptography API
(CAPI) and is long-term replacement Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG). These
SDKs are used to create Windows-based applications that need to use cryptographic
functions to achieve their security requirements and data protection [54].
Providers associated with CAPI are named as Cryptographic Service Providers (CSPs)
and implement cryptographic algorithms and key storage. In addition, CSP can be com-
bined with smart cards to grant an higher level of security and can implement Secure
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Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication protocols [54]. On
the other hand, CNG separates the features of algorithm implementation and key storage
in two different providers called Cryptographic Algorithm Providers (CAPs) and Key
Storage Providers (KSPs). CAP implements hashing, key exchange, symmetric and asym-
metric algorithms. KSP manages key operations - such as creating, deleting, exporting,
importing and storing - and are used for asymmetric cryptography and signing.
Lina [49] discusses that CAPI has few algorithms and is becoming outdated with the
current advances in technologies. CNG is more extensible and has support for more
algorithms, including user-defined algorithms. As also, is the most recent SDK and
is planned to be the substitute of CAPI. The next subsection will focus on the CNG
architecture and KSPs design and implementation.
2.3.1 CNG and Key Storage Providers Overview
CNG is divided in six different classes of algorithms from the function perspective and
each class exposes its own primitive API. For example, asymmetric encryption will use
RSA and signature will use DSA or ECDSA [53]. Also, each algorithm can have multiple
implementations offered by providers, but only one will be used at a given time.
KSPs are basically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) 1 (i.e, libraries containing code that
is only loaded at run time when a functionality is requested). We can create our custom
KSPs with our own algorithm implementations, but is necessary to register them first with
CNG, because only after registration it becomes available to system applications [54].
The main advantage of KSP is that it provides a model for key storage that allows appli-
cations to accomplish their asymmetric encryption and key storage requirements [49]. It
could guarantee the security of private keys because after the key is stored, it can’t be read.
Applications access the KSPs on the system to accomplish its functional requirements
through the key storage router which is the main routine in this model and provides
details, such as key isolation, from both the application and the provider itself [49].
KSPs implemented by software define storage and execution mechanisms, but does
not provide a high level of security. On the other hand, KSPs based on hardware im-
plementation can grant a higher level of security, but are more expensive. To balance
this trade-off, we can execute the security computing such as private keys and certificate
storage in the hardware and implement the other functions in the operating system.
In PKI systems, encryption algorithms, certificates and signatures technology is ex-
tensively used to satisfy confidentiality, integrity and authentication requirements, and,
as consequence, the approach used to store certificates and its private keys is very im-
portant [49]. Meanwhile, KSP provides a interface model to connect and communicate
with one of the data storage solutions discussed, then the private key could be stored in a
secure environment with specific function such as encrypt or signature.
1https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/815065/what-is-a-dll
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2.4 Critical Analysis
2.4.1 Summary
In the context of the dissertation objectives, NFC and Bluetooth are possible solutions
studied to establish a secure communication channel between the mobile phone (running
the Mobile Cryptographic Provider supported by Android SEs on a conventional smart-
phone) and the computer (where applications running in a Windows-OS execution en-
vironment can request cryptographic operations through local Windows-Cryptographic
Provider functions, transparently executed in the remote Mobile Cryptographic Provider).
NFC is a proximity-based technology to transfer data between devices, that can oper-
ate in a variety of modes and has few security and privacy issues, with the risk managed
under physical awareness control by its users, communicating in very short physical dis-
tance. NFC and its enhancements on security standards are in an on-going in the current
standardization effort, and research solutions to improve the security properties.
Bluetooth is also a wireless technology, with more flexible mechanisms to address
different communication ranges, without the need of extreme proximity between de-
vices. The standard feature Low Energy (particularly related to Bluetooth v4.0 and v5.0)
emerged as a relevant reference designed for generic adoption, from smartphones or lap-
top computers to low-power IoT devices. Apparently, BLE v5.0 will have a strong impact
in the unification of Bluetooth-Communication support, with the new smartphones en-
abling this version, with flexible support at the firmware level to operate the Bluetooth
communication in different settings, for the optimization of trade-offs related to distance
ranges, energy, and throughput rates. Despite that we must also consider the relevance
of the installation base for Bluetooth v4.0 (4.1 and 4.2), Bluetooth is a more flexible and
available solution for our goals, when compared with NFC.
NFC could have advantages over Bluetooth from the technological and economic view-
points, for certain application scenarios. NFC is implicitly resistant to MITM attacks with
the direct control of communicating devices operating in proximity assumptions. This
makes NFC an ideal method for secure pairing for proximity payment systems, for ex-
ample. On the other hand, Bluetooth has higher range and consequently a higher attack
surface, depending on the covered ranges. However, it has an advantage over NFC since
it comes with standard security protocols, parametrizable in different secure modes and
enforcement levels. When using the most secure modes and maximized policy enforce-
ments, it is not required to add extra security mechanisms to protect communications.
However, system-level security can require extra-layers of security, to enforce security
properties at system and application level, or to reinforce the security properties at the
communication layer and wireless data-link level. Depending on the requirements, Blue-
tooth Classic and BLE implement security mechanisms to handle the threats against the
channel, although may be not enough to mitigate other possible attacks.
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To achieve a secure storage and mobile execution environment we studied two ap-
proaches for Android-based solutions: SE support and a virtual alternative, the HCE
framework. SE provides a safe and secure environment to host applications, sensitive
data and cryptographic credentials, and execute operations under isolated abstractions.
Given its high security standards, the SE is mainly incorporated in NFC-enabled de-
vices. Although, not all mobile phones have installed in hardware a SE chip (to minimize
trustability assumptions to hardware-enabled support), or have UUIC-cards for the same
purpose, the software design for SE can be used to address these possibilities in the future.
HCE is a much more flexible solution that creates virtual SEs, bypassing the involvement
of mobile operators and manufacturers in the provisioning of controlled SEs. However, is
more vulnerable in terms of security, since it is executed as an operating system service.
To guarantee the communication between the computer and a mobile phone, a Key
Storage Provider will be integrated, which will be responsible for forwarding requests
for cryptographic operations to the remote mobile cryptographic provider running in
a mobile phone, receiving the correspondent results, as happen in requesting digital
signatures for documents managed in the client computer. This KSP will be registered
through the Windows CNG to be available to other applications in a transparent way.
2.4.2 Discussion for Dissertation Approach
Our conducted study on the related work allowed for the comprehension of issues, to
establish a rationale for the approach of our objectives.
On the choice between NFC versus Bluetooth. From the viewpoint of physical loca-
tions, the NFC proximity demand (which is essential for payment and ticketing applica-
tions) offers very limited device location flexibility in comparison with Bluetooth.
Rationale: NFC offers a good level of security, but for us is not a good option, because the proxim-
ity demand can be inconvenient to users and, like smart cards, would be necessary an additional
reader to allow NFC on the computer. We desire to use our smartphone as a service host in an
office environment, where we can be far from each other, without having to bring together the
service and client devices to perform an action. Therefore, we intend to use Bluetooth technology
as our secure communication channel. To mitigate attacks, a rigorous set of Bluetooth security
mechanisms must be implemented.
On the different versions of Bluetooth and related security assumptions. Different
versions of Bluetooth were promoted in the context of the activities of different Bluetooth
Special Interest Group (SIG) working groups, with different implementations causing
problems in interoperability of different devices from different vendors and different
versions supported by different manufacturers. These problems were progressively cor-
rected in Bluetooth firmware of different manufacturers, particularly, after the version 4.0.
Additionally, Bluetooth security standardization define different security modes, comple-
mentary security levels for devices and services, and two trustability levels (trusted and
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untrusted), which must be properly employed and depend on a concrete solution.
Rationale: For the objectives and regarding the differences in the above criteria and compatibility
issues on different Bluetooth versions, we will address as our security baseline, Bluetooth Security
Modes and levels, as defined for BR/EDR/HS devices, adopting the Security Mode 4 Level 4 as
it requires Secure Connections. LE and v4.2 devices should use LE Security Mode 1 Level 4 as
it implements LE Secure Connections. From this security baseline for Bluetooth authenticated
pairing and key-establishment processes to setup the secure channel under mutual authentication
assumptions, we can leverage an extra-layer of security, where data is encrypted before the trans-
mission on the established channel. For this extra-layer at service-level we can base our solution
on Numeric Comparison methods, where both Bluetooth devices can display a six-digit number
and allowing a user to enter a “yes” or “no” response.
On mobile trust execution considerations. Mobile execution and storage solutions
such as SE and HCE have similar goal but are implemented in different levels of abstrac-
tion, within the mobile environment. With SE, the data cannot leave the device itself
and a strong level of security and an optimal level of interoperability is provided, with
trusted execution environment guarantees possibly provided in isolated hardware-level,
thus minimising the trust-computing model assumptions to hardware. The main problem
is the need of extra hardware in the mobile phone, because not all mobile manufactures
(or packaged devices promoted by manufacturer and operators) provide such solutions.
HCE can be implemented by a wide range of mobile phones without software or hardware
restrictions, but is less secure than a physical SE, since HCE-based applications use cloud
storage services and run on the OS. The problem in this case is that the trust computing
model assumptions are provided at the level of the Mobile OS services (e.g, Android OS
services), which are vulnerable to attacks compromising the OS behaviour.
Rationale:We want to achieve a secure solution where the certificate private keys are never shared
out of the control of the SE environment, and stored in a secure location where cryptographic
operations that use them can execute. SEs can provide us with this isolation from the operating
system, hence will be the secure storage approach to follow. Recent support of SEs for runtime
services enabled by recent technology of mobile operating systems (e.g, recent versions of Android
OS) enables a robust usage of SEs on almost every mobile phone, then hardware constraints will
not be a problem as discussed above.
On Software Attesttation guarantees. As far as we studied, SEs don’t have many
security issues given their implicit high level of security, but one problem detected was
the possibility of a client computer "to talk"with a fake SE-based crypto provider solution,
after the compromise of its support, in a mobile OS.
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Rationale: To verify or check if client devices (computers) are really integrating with the correct
remote service, we must implement a Remote Attestation protocol. Thus, it will allow devices
communicating with the SE to check the authenticity and the integrity of the software and/or
hardware in the boot process and running in the SE environment of the mobile phone. The
enforcement of the execution of such protocol will be considered as a key-point in the final design
and implementation of our solution.
On managing data in the SE solution. To manage the data stored and the crypto-
graphic operations executing inside SEs, we might need to implement a remote mobile
crypto provider to run inside the SEs. A second crypto provider, particularly a Windows
crypto provider, will be also necessary to send the cryptographic operations requests to
the first crypto provider, allowing the Windows crypto provider to execute these oper-
ations remotely in the smartphone. In our implementation we will consider the client
computer as trusted, focusing in the security design of the remote mobile crypto provider.
Rationale: The mobile crypto provider will be implemented as an application and SEs services
running on the Android OS, and will be remotely used by the client computer whenever a cryp-
tographic operation (namely, a standardised digital signature request) is demanded. The Win-
dows crypto provider, more precisely, a key storage provider as studied previously, will imple-
ment proxy functions, transparently redirecting the local operations from applications (such
as a signature of a PDF managed by Adobe Reader, for example) to the mobile remote crypto-
graphic provider. We will give the necessary support to define policy enforcements at device-
level (mapped on firmware configurations for Bluetooth security enforcement) and system-level
(mapped on complementary designed security services, in an extra-layer of security).
Gomez et al. [38] provides evaluation criteria for BLE performance, regarding different
metrics: (i) for power consumption, the average consumption decreases, since devices may
be in sleep mode for a greater fraction of time, although, fast resynchronization methods
can increase the values; (ii) for latency, with very low bit error rate, the average value of
round-trip and one-way message exchanges are smaller than 2 ms and 1 ms, respectively,
but for high bit error rate values, the average latency increases three times more. Without
errors, the latency of a one-way exchange can reach 676.7 µs. The maximum throughput
measured was 58.48 KBps which can be influenced by many factors.
Rationale: In our dissertation, a low energy consumption is not a primary goal because the num-
ber of cryptographic operations, including signing and certificate registration, is expected to be
low, and does not force a significant energy consumption by the mobile phone. Thus, we intend
to use the Bluetooth BR/EDR implementation as the primary approach to establish Bluetooth
channels, because it offers a solution with better data rate and a bigger payload size, providing a
faster transmission of data, analysing the impact of our designed solution in terms of throughput
and latency conditions, for different security parametrizations.
A recent experience [90] with NFC-enabled devices, including two applications, one
SE-based and the other HCE-based, measured the execution time that devices take to carry
out non-trivial cryptographic operations such as encryption and signing via Application
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Protocol Data Units (APDUs). For the SE-based application, the testing protocol took
on average 1982 ms to fully execute with 85% of the time spent on digitally signing
messages. For the HCE application, the testing protocol fully executes on average in
213 ms for a CPU running at 960 Mhz and 572 ms for a CPU running at 300 Mhz with
similar signing and encryption execution times, but with a significant variation between
the maximum and minimum values. HCE is faster than SE, but tends to be less secure,
because no security mechanisms were employed and if they were the application would
become much slower. We will observe the equivalent impact in evaluating the proposed
solution.
Rationale: We will prefer to achieve a good trade-off between security and usability, in order to
achieve the best security, instead of high execution speeds or long-range communications. We
expect that cryptographic operations remotely executed in the mobile cryptographic provider will
not be significantly slow, and maintain the same order of magnitude for throughput and latency,
comparing with the studies in performance characterises of Bluetooth connections. Therefore,
the SE approach is compatible with our objectives in the sense that it provides the desired level
of security in the mobile environment to protect the sensitive information on Bluetooth security
association parameters, as well as, on using and managing Private Keys.
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System Model and Architecture
In this chapter we present the designed solution to address the Bluetooth-based Mobile
Key Storage Provider (KSP) (or BluetoothKSP), as a generic support for applications run-
ning in Windows machines. As stated before, the main use of the BluetoothKSP, is its
ability to obtain standardized digital signatures of documents (file formats) that can be
generated from Windows-based applications. For the purpose, the BluetoothKSP offers a
transparent support for the local Windows applications, as a local Dynamic Link Library
(DLL) acting as a proxy that implements the conventional cryptographic primitives as
supported by local Microsoft Key Storage Providers (MKSPs), but supported by the inter-
connected mobile system (via Bluetooth) where the real BluetoothKSP runs. Then, from
the Windows-based support, the BluetoothKSP does not implement its own functions,
and the provided DLL acts as a transparent pass-through layer, facilitating the communi-
cation between the operating system and the remote BluetoothKSP implementation. In
the remaining of the chapter we will present and discuss the designed solution, starting
from the generic system model assumptions, including the studied threat model, and
provided architecture (in Section 3.1) and going in the details of the supported facilities
equivalent to conventional local Windows KSP functions, namely those implementing
standardized digital signatures (in Section 3.3). Then, we discuss the particular architec-
ture of the BluetoothKSP and its components executing on Windows OS (in Section 3.2)
and the related configurations required for Windows-based applications use the mobile
crypto provider (in Section 3.4). Finally, we discuss the possible security enforcements
for the Bluetooth pairing functions (in Section 3.5) and present final considerations and
remarks on the designed solution (in Section 3.6).
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3.1 System Model and Architecture
In this section it is described an overview of the system model, including its adversary
model, its core components and the system interactions between these entities.
3.1.1 System Model Overview
Bluetooth Secure Channel
Proxy
BluetoothKSP
SE 
Adobe Reader
Remote
BluetoothKSP
Figure 3.1: System Model Overview.
In figure 3.1 is illustrated a simplified version of the system model, composed by a
computer and a smartphone that exchange information via a secure Bluetooth channel
making use of both crypto providers in each node. The system built employs a client-
server architecture between two nodes were the computer acts as client hosting the proxy
BluetoothKSP and the smartphone as server hosting the remote BluetoothKSP (the real
one). The Windows-side (proxy BluetoothKSP) is responsible for ensuring the commu-
nication between the smartphone and different Windows applications running in the
computer. The remote BluetoothKSP is responsible for processing the cryptographic
operations requested by the proxy BluetoothKSP and securely managing access to the cer-
tificate private keys inside the Secure Element (SE). This remote BluetoothKSP can work
as a service running in the background (or not) in the smartphone waiting for remote
signature requests from a client computer. The SE ensures that the signature requests
issued by the proxy BluetoothKSP are securely executed in an isolated context from the
Android OS and other mobile applications.
Besides the signature operations, the mobile application (i.e, the remote BluetoothKSP)
accepts certificate requests from client-computers that desire to import new certificates
into the Windows OS, configuring the crypto provider of the certificates with our Blue-
toothKSP, enabling Windows-based applications to make use of our remote BluetoothKSP.
Plus, this mobile application, provides functionalities of certificate management such as
certificate import into the Android OS, certificate entries removal from the Android Key-
store and displaying of Android Keystore certificate entries. Hence, we can see the remote
BluetoothKSP or mobile application as a certificate manager.
The Bluetooth communication channel has a security baseline composed by the Pair-
ing mechanism and security levels, which is possible to be enforced with an extra layer of
security, specially when working with less secure Bluetooth devices (i.e, mobile devices
with old Bluetooth versions). The data exchanged between the nodes inside the secure
channel is always public, such as a document hash or a certificate containing only the
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public key, and no private data is transported through Bluetooth. All the private data to
be used is stored inside the smartphone SE and never leaves it as mentioned before.
For initial validation, we considered the Adobe Acrobat Reader desktop application
as the case-study of a Windows-based application, but our system has support for other
applications such as Microsoft Outlook and Word. Except for applications that make
usage of PKCS#11 uniquely (for example, Mozilla Firefox and other Linux-based appli-
cations). This is due to the fact that these applications do not support Windows APIs
to interact with cryptographic token drivers, such as our BluetoothKSP. This way, our
system guarantees only transparency for Windows-based applications.
Given this system model assumptions and all the basic mechanisms involved, we
perform an analysis of the potential security vulnerabilities in the following subsection.
3.1.2 Threat Model
As described in section 2.1.2.1, Bluetooth has built-in security mechanisms that provide
a certain level of security depending on the Bluetooth version of the computing device.
However, we have shown that these basic security features do not provide a strong pro-
tection to data transported in the communication channels and some attacks are feasible.
We assume an adversary model where the Bluetooth communication channels are
vulnerable to attacks that intend to tamper or modify the data being exchange such as
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) and Eavesdropping attacks. More concretely, an attacker
with ability to eavesdrop or tamper the communications between the client and server
endpoints could change the Bluetooth packets content to some data that they desired to be
signed, leading to users signing forged documents without knowing it on the smartphone.
For the mobile execution environment, we assume that the user private keys can not
be compromised by attackers, because only applications with permissions (in this case,
our remote BluetoothKSP) can access the SE through the Android Keystore System to
store keys or execute cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker that tries to
compromise the sealed container used by our mobile application using another applica-
tion that he/she has installed on the device will not have success. Thus, we consider the
SE as our Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
For the scope of this dissertation, attacks coming from the Android OS or malicious
code executing instead of the correct OS were not considered. This means that our solu-
tion nodes not rely on the integrity of the OS to secure their data. For example, attackers
that can acquire the control of the Android OS through a root exploit, allowing them to
run applications with root permissions and access its data and modify its content. Also,
a malicious behaviour on the part of Windows OS, such as a corrupted KSP that changes
the signatures requests or a malicious desktop application that makes use of the KSP to
request forged signatures, was not considered and was leaved out of the scope. However,
we plan to study these potential attack vectors with more detail in the future.
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3.1.3 Architectural Components
Our solution is built as a service with the architecture depicted in figure 3.2. The system
has several entities in each node (client and server), being the BluetoothKSP, the Win-
dowsCertificateManager and the CertificateManager, the core components of our solution
(dark blue boxes). BluetoothKSP is our proxy mobile crypto provider, WindowsCertifi-
cateManager is a graphical Windows desktop application that also has the ability to
import and display certificates existing in the Windows OS and CertificateManager is
the mobile application that has the remote BluetoothKSP and certificate management
functionalities. The remaining (light blue boxes) are the built-in or black-box compo-
nents, which are the components that support and are used by the core elements. All
these entities will be described in this section for a better understanding of the proposed
system model.
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CNG 
API.NET Framework
Windows
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Driver
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Bluetooth
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Figure 3.2: System Architecture and Interaction Flows.
WindowsCertificateManager. This client-side component allows the user to request
certificates to import into the Windows OS from the remote BluetoothKSP running on the
mobile phone, through the .NET framework which forwards the request packet and waits
for the reply using the Windows Bluetooth Driver. Then, it imports the list of certificates
received into the operating system (more precisely, into the Window Certificate Store)
creating a link between each certificate and the BluetoothKSP. This certificates exchange
is required to enable any desktop application to use our mobile crypto provider to request
signatures later, and to use the corresponding user certificate that contains the public key
to verify the signature executed by the remote BluetoothKSP.
BluetoothKSP. The proxy mobile crypto provider that forwards requests for cryp-
tographic operations such as digital signatures from desktop applications (e.g, Adobe
Acrobat Reader) to the remote BluetoothKSP and receives the correspondent signature
result using the Windows sockets API to access the Windows Bluetooth driver. The signa-
ture content is then forwarded to the desktop applications. All these interactions between
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the BluetoothKSP and user applications are done though the Windows Cryptography API:
Next Generation (CNG). This means that, our BluetoothKSP communicates directly with
the CertificateManager by sending unsigned and receiving signed documents hashes, re-
spectively, forwarding them from and to the desktop application, acting as a proxy. When
the CertificateManager receives the signature request through the Bluetooth Service linked
to the Bluetooth HAL, it will execute the signature generation in the SE context, in which
the private keys are stored. This generates a signed document hash that will be forward
back to the BluetoothKSP also through the Bluetooth Service.
CertificateManager. The Android application that represents the remote mobile crypto
provider and implements the features of a KSP, but also enables the importing of certifi-
cates (resident in PKCS#12 files) existing in the mobile device storage into the Android
Keystore, consequently, inside the SE container, and the listing of certificates already im-
ported. This CertificateManager will access the hardware-sealed SE through the Android
Keystore System, which is responsible for managing all SEs integrated in the smartphone
and enables the user to store private keys in these sealed containers, as well as, execute
cryptographic operations. Additionally, these system offers the possibility of implement-
ing control access policies to restrict how and when private keys can be used. Much of
the mobile security relies on the SE which will implement all cryptographic operations
and request our consent for any action evolving sensitive data stored in the SE. Figure 3.3
illustrates where this Android application is placed in the Android Framework, where
the other mobile components are also.
Certificate
Manager
android.bluetooth
(API)
Secure Element
HAL
Figure 3.3: Mobile System Architecture and Android Framework.
Bluetooth HAL and Driver. These two are the low-level components abstracted by the
Android Bluetooth API which is used by our CertificateManager to transmit and receive
Bluetooth packets. While acting as a server, the smartphone runs the CertificateManager
with a Bluetooth service on the background that waits for requests coming from a client
computer and executes the operations demanded, responding with the operation result
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and other useful data. Those requests packets are transported through the Bluetooth
Driver and the Bluetooth HAL as well as the response packets.
Secure Element. The sealed-hardware part of the smartphone that provides a secure
environment for storage, management and access control of cryptographic keys, and exe-
cution of cryptographic operations, reproducing the actual behaviour of a crypto provider,
but using a sealed container for storage. This hardware piece is the main responsible for
the execution of signatures in the context of our smartphone and solution since no other
component implements signature algorithms neither executes digital signatures.
3.1.4 Components Interactions
Before executing the signature operations with the mobile crypto provider, the computer
client must first obtain the respective certificates which will be used in the signature
processes for requesting the signature and further verifying the signature. To obtain the
certificates, the computer and the smartphone must first perform an initialization proto-
col by exchanging two Bluetooth packets (as shown in Table 3.1). This Initialization (or
Configuration) Protocol is started by the WindowsCertificateManager when its demanded
to import certificates into the Windows OS with our BluetoothKSP. A request packet (M1)
is sent to the CertificateManager containing an operation type (op) and the number of
certificates requested (cert_num). Op indicates the Android application which operation
the client is requesting: a certificates register or a signature operation. In this case, a
operation code associated with the certificate register operation is placed in the op field
of the packet. Cert_num provides the possibility to request a specific number of certifi-
cates from the CertificateManager or by default all certificates existing in the smartphone
are retrieved. Then, the CertificateManager replies to the WindowsCertificateManager by
sending a response packet (M2) containing the list of certificates available in the mobile
device. Finally, the user also has the possibility to select which certificates he/she wants
to import and discard the rest.
Initialization Protocol
(M1)C→ S : (op,cert_num)
(M2)S→ C : (certs_list)
Table 3.1: Initialization Protocol.
After the configuration phase, a desktop application can request a signature to the
mobile crypto provider and successfully verify the result. To accomplish this process, the
computer and the smartphone must perform a signature protocol by exchanging other
two Bluetooth packets (as shown in Table 3.2). This Signature Protocol begins when a
desktop application starts a signature process with an imported certificate associated
with the BluetoothKSP. A request packet (M1) is sent to the CertificateManager containing
an operation type (op), the document hash (hash), the certificate sequential number (sn),
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the certificate issuerDN (idn) and the Object Identifiers (OIDs) of the hash and encryption
algorithms. Similarly to the previous protocol, the op field is used to distinct the operation
requested, in this case, a op code representing the signature operation is used. The
hash attribute is the document hash computed by the desktop application that must be
signed by the remote BluetoothKSP; the sn and idn (i.e, the combined unique identifier
of the certificate being used in the signature) indicates the CertificateManager from which
certificate it must obtain the private key to execute the signature; and the OIDs indicates
which hash and public-key algorithms must be used to perform the signature, more
precisely, which signature algorithm must be used.
Signature Protocol
(M1)C→ S : (op,hash,sn, idn,hash_oid,enc_oid)
(M2)S→ C : (sign_res)
Table 3.2: Signature Protocol.
3.2 BluetoothKSP Architecture and Components
In this section, we cover the architectural components of the Cryptography API: Next
Generation (CNG) KSPs [53] and the runtime support provided by CNG to them.
3.2.1 Key Storage Provider Architecture
CNG provides a plug-in model for private key storage that allows adapting to demands
of creating applications that use cryptography features such as public or private key
encryption, as well as storage of key material. That is, we can plug into CNG our own
cryptographic key storage provider with our own implementations of the algorithms. All
common Windows-based applications (e.g, Adobe Reader, Microsoft Word and Outlook)
access the cryptographic functions exported by the custom KSP through the Windows
CNG, more precisely, through the Key Storage Router. All access to private keys pass
through the Key Storage Router, which provides a set of functions for storing and using
private keys, and is audited by CNG. Additionally, the CNG API can communicate
with the PKCS#11 API to invoke similar cryptographic functions demanded by common
applications that use hardware cryptographic tokens as solutions for secure storage and
execution. Figure 3.4 illustrates the CNG KSP architecture and all its components.
Our custom CNG BluetoothKSP is responsible for executing signatures remotely with
private keys not stored in the computer, thus it does not manages or stores any private key,
it only stores a reference or handler for the private key by creating a private key container
without any key inside. This container is created when the corresponding certificate
is imported into the Windows OS with BluetoothKSP as the cryptographic provider of
33
CHAPTER 3. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
Figure 3.4: Architecture of the CNG Key Storage Providers (taken from [53]).
the certificate keys. As consequence, it does not perform signature generations, it only
redirects the computed hash that needs to be signed to the CertificateManager.
CNG BluetoothKSP was implemented in a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) that exports
an interface with a set of functions that the CNG Router calls to perform key storage
operations. In general, each CNG KSP implements a list of callback functions provided
by the CNG (available here [53]), so that the Router can call the callback functions imple-
mentations of each provider. The mapping between the generic callback functions and
its implementation is defined using a specific table structure in the KSP DLL. Thus, every
time a desktop application makes a call to CNG to perform a given cryptographic oper-
ation, the CNG Router will select the callback function implementation of the provider
selected by the application correspondent to that operation.
In addition, this architecture provides isolation for the long term keys so that they are
never shown to the application process. This key isolation feature is only available for
the Microsoft KSP (as we can see in Figure 3.4), this mean that, only the Microsoft KSP
is loaded with the key isolation service (or also known as LSA process). Therefore, the
remaining third party KSPs, including our BluetoothKSP, are not loaded with this service.
As previously explained, to make custom third-party KSPs available for use with
Windows-based applications they are required to be plugged into CNG through a provider
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registration function (named BCryptRegisterProvider) that adds the provider to the CNG
Router, making it available for future cryptographic operation calls.
3.2.2 Runtime Support
At runtime, the CNG KSPs can work in user and kernel mode. Such as CAPI, CNG can
also be used in both modes to fully support the cryptography features, but not all the
CNG functions can be called from kernel mode. Microsoft documentation explicitly
states which functions can not be called from kernel mode [53]. Another constraint about
this mode is that CNG does not support third-party providers and algorithms running
in kernel mode. Only the algorithm implementations provided by Microsoft through the
kernel mode CNG APIs are supported in kernel mode. For example, our BluetoothKSP
cannot run in this privileged mode. The cryptographic services are provided to the kernel
components through the Microsoft kernel security support provider interface (named
Ksecdd.sys), which is a cryptographic module residing at the Windows kernel mode level
and runs as a kernel mode export driver. The only exception at the level of cryptographic
constructions supported by the interface Ksecdd.sys is the cryptographic algorithm DSA.
3.3 Cryptographic Functions
Our BluetoothKSP mainly provides digital signatures support, but also offers several ba-
sic cryptographic-related operations that different desktop applications may require to
perform the signature operations, such as public key initialization (e.g, Acrobat Reader)
or the public key exporting (e.g, Microsoft Word). Furthermore, it provides Key Storage
Provider (KSP) management operations, such as KSP properties getter and setter func-
tions, and KSP initialization operations. We can call these basic functions invoked by
desktop applications to execute digital signature processes as KSP pre-operations. Each
desktop application can invoked a different set of these operations.
3.3.1 Windows KSP Functions and Supported Operations
Regarding the Windows CNG, it provides a generic list of functions that each KSP must
implement [53], so that, external desktop applications can invoke all the operations that
satisfy their cryptographic demands through the CNG, independently of the current
crypto provider being used. Our BluetoothKSP only implements or actually uses a small
set of these functions, since we are only focused in cryptographic operations related with
digital signatures and some operations are very application-specific, such that, we are
only interested in functions that conventional Windows applications (such as Acrobat
Reader, Microsoft Word and Outlook) use in order to provide transparency.
The functions provided by our BluetoothKSP API are summarized below:
• OpenProvider: Initializes the provider, retrieving a handle to the provider;
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• FreeProvider: Releases or frees the provider handle created by the OpenProvider
function;
• GetProviderProperty: Retrieves the value of a given property of the KSP;
• SetProviderProperty: Updates a property value of the KSP;
• IsAlgSupported: Determines whether the provider supports a specific cryptographic
algorithm or not;
• EnumAlgorithms: Enumerates the names of the cryptographic algorithms supported
by the KSP;
• EnumKeys: Enumerates the names of the keys stored by the KSP;
• OpenKey: Opens an existing and stored key, i.e, initializes a key object, retrieving a
handle to that object;
• FreeKey: Releases or frees a object or key handle created by the OpenKey function;
• ImportKey: Imports a CNG key from a given memory BLOB;
• ExportKey: Exports a CNG key to a memory BLOB, more precisely, a public key
BLOB. Notice that, this BLOB has a different format according with the key algo-
rithm;
• SignHash: Forwards a Bluetooth packet containing a hash value (plus the remaining
information described in Section 3.1) to the remote BluetoothKSP via a secure Blue-
tooth communication channel and waits until this remote provider signs the hash
and sends back the signature value. In other words, it is performed the Signature
Protocol;
• VerifySignature: Verifies a signature value over a given hash using a specific public
key handle retrieved by the OpenKey or ExportKey function.
Therefore, when a desktop application is calling one of these functions, what it is
really calling is the respective KSP callback function (NCryptX) provided by the CNG
(where X is the name of one of the above functions). For example, when Acrobat Reader
needs a signature, it calls the NCryptSignHash function from the CNG, indicating the KSP
that provides the desired implementation of that function, which consequently calls the
SignHash function of the chosen KSP.
Another supported feature available by our solution is the certificate import previ-
ously described in the Initialization Protocol. Basically, consists in importing a given
certificate into the Windows operative system setting the cryptographic provider of the
certificate private key as our BluetoothKSP, i.e, the private key will be stored and man-
aged by BluetoothKSP. Although, the public key crypto provider is a Windows default
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KSP. Usually, this operation implies that the KSP keeps the private key of the certificate
in a secure storage area, but in our case only the certificate public part is persistently
stored and a link between our BluetoothKSP and the certificate private key is created.
This certificate registration process is similar to the one described in [49] with some dif-
ferences. In general, the steps are: (1) read the certificate file which was already received
through Bluetooth and create a certificate context object from the encoded portion; (2)
set new certificate properties related with key storage (such as configuring the private
key crypto provider as our BluetoothKSP and assign a name to the private key container
which is used by KSPs to distinguish keys) and append them to the certificate context; (3)
add the certificate to the Windows certificate store using the updated context object.
However, to achieve this certificate import from the Windows-side, the certificate and
its respective private key must have been previously imported into the Android Keystore
(more precisely, stored in the Secure Element (SE)). This means that, if no private keys
exists inside the SE, the list of certificates received by the WindowsCertificateManager
application during a certificate request will be empty and will be impossible to further
perform remote digital signatures with the certificates using our BluetoothKSP. As such,
before starting the Initialization Protocol, the user needs to import the certificates through
the CertificateManager in order to be able to import certificates into the Windows OS, and
as consequence, perform digital signatures using our BluetoothKSP. To accomplish this
operation the following sequence of steps is required: (1) search the Android file system
for the certificate file (i.e, a .p12 file); (2) retrieve the public and private key inside that
file; (3) add a new entry in the Android Keystore for that cryptographic keys.
3.3.2 Provided Digital Signatures
By default, the CNG provides several built-in cryptographic algorithm implementations
grouped in different classes according with their cryptographic operation. One of them
is the algorithm class Signature which includes RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
and DSA based digital signature schemes. However, our BluetoothKSP does not imple-
ment any of these algorithms, only redirects the signature operation requests to the real
crypto provider running in the mobile environment, restricting in some way which type
of signatures are allowed or supported by the remote BluetoothKSP.
In relation to the digital signatures schemes available by our BluetoothKSP, are in-
cluded the following standard constructions: RSA-based signature schemes, such as RSA-
PKCS#1 and RSASSA-PSS [58, 78, 79], DSA-based signature schemes [31, 61] and its
ECC variant, ECDSA [1, 12, 69]. For this algorithms we selected a group of key lengths
composed by RSA and DSA keys with 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits; and ECC keys
with P-256, P-384 and P-521 elliptic curves standardized by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). These key lengths were chosen according with the
algorithms and respective key sizes supported by the Android Keystore System since it
is the component responsible for performing the digital signatures. The only algorithm
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from the supported digital signatures that can’t be executed with the Android Keystore
provider is DSA, which is already not supported by the Android OS. Therefore, the use
of DSA will be for testing purposes only. Additionally, the desktop applications that
demand digital signatures through our BluetoothKSP must use for signature verification
a crypto provider that offers the same digital signature schemes as BluetoothKSP in order
to validate the signature. Any other desktop application that requires a different type of
scheme, will have it’s request rejected by the BluetoothKSP.
The signature scheme to use is dynamically selected in our solution when some desk-
top application invokes a signature request. That is, given the hash computed by this
application and the certificate chosen to use in the signature, the BluetoothKSP selects
the target signature scheme (i.e, the combination of the hash and encryption algorithms)
to be used and forwards it to the smartphone. More concretely, the BluetoothKSP obtains
the hash algorithm from the hash size and the encryption algorithm from the certificate
public key. The BluetoothKSP, which needs the signature value, indicates the OIDs of the
algorithms in a field of the packet sent to the remote BluetoothKSP, so that it knows which
signature scheme the BluetoothKSP demands to be used in the signature generation. The
next section presents a comparison between these supported digital signature schemes
regarding the level of security offered by each one.
3.3.3 Comparative Analysis on Provided Digital Signatures
The experiments on digital signatures that will be later presented focus on the expected
performance while using RSA, ECC or even DSA based digital signatures, in standard-
ized constructions adopted for our prototype. Yet, we must noticed that standardized
DSA-based constructions using SHA-1 [61] have been discontinued by Google from the
Android OS reference, after version 6.0 (API level 23) 1, due to collision attacks against
the SHA-1 hash function [23, 86]. Therefore, we restricted our following discussion to
RSA and ECC public-key algorithms.
In this section, we intend to compare another interesting perspective on the compari-
son of RSA and ECC based signatures where we must additionally consider the security
level comparison, beyond the performance analysis. As it is well known in general, the
level of security in cryptosystems is becoming a primary concern as we would expect,
with the key size criteria for different algorithms taking a particular relevance, comple-
mentarily to the robustness of each cryptographic algorithm itself and the usage efficiency.
Security level consists in a measure of the strength that a crypto primitive - such as an
algorithm or an hash function - achieves and is usually expressed in bits. Current cryp-
tosystems provide a minimum security level in the form of 128 bits of security, which
is required for systems that communicate and provide information with confidentiality
1https://developer.android.com/about/versions/marshmallow/android-6.0-changes
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protection [14]. The security level of cryptographic algorithms comes from the combina-
tion of each specific algorithm mathematical construction and its key size. For example,
it is known by cryptographic experts that a 128-bit security level can be achieved to-
day with 128-bit Algorithm Encryption Standard (AES) keys (as reference for symmetric
encryption), 256-bit ECC keys (for ECC-based encryption), and 3072-bit RSA keys (for
RSA-based encryption) [14, 83]. If ignoring the implementation issues related to the
mathematical instantiation of the cryptographic schemes, these algorithms alongside
those specified key sizes will generally offer the same level of security.
Table 3.3 illustrates the comparison of security levels, when using today different algo-
rithms and key lengths. As the table dictates, typical RSA implementations that currently
employ 1024 and 2048 bit keys are less secure than the AES-128 reference, showing
that asymmetric cryptography is not necessarily stronger than symmetric cryptography
in each specific use. Also, ECC can provide higher levels of security with smaller keys
comparing with RSA.
Table 3.3: Security Level Comparison for Conventional Cryptographic Algorithms (taken
from [62]).
For our comparative analysis of the trade-off between efficiency and security of RSA
and ECC based signatures, we must take into account the corresponding level of security
of used keys. As it is well known, key lengths generally increase with time and the years
to break a given key length increase with the key size, as the computational power avail-
able to possible attackers continues to increase, which is a manifestation of the so called
cryptographic arms race. Nowadays, it is recommended for example that AES using 256-
bit keys (AES-256) be employed for data encryption rather than the prior accepted AES
with 128-bit keys (AES-128), since it only provides a near term protection (i.e, security
for at least ten years) [83]. In the case of using ECC for key management (or key estab-
lishment) schemes of an AES-256 based session, it is recommended to use 512-bit ECC
session keys to maintain the security level (as shown in Table 3.3), because the security
strength that can be supported by sessions keys is determined by the weakest algorithm
and key length. For example, if a 224-bit ECC key was used, the bits of security provided
would decrease to 112. To achieve the same level of security strength of the AES-256
using RSA encryption, 15 360-bit keys must be required, although are computationally
infeasible in current days, particularly when we use mobile systems with autonomous
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battery or embedded systems and IoT devices. This limitation does not exist when using
ECC, which has very small keys compared with RSA that enables faster processing times
and lower demands on memory and bandwidth.
This notable contrast between the feasibility of ECC over RSA in relation with the
security strength provided clearly indicates that ECC will be the algorithm more and
more adopted in the future for asymmetric-cryptographic operations on systems where
computational power or data storage capacities are limited, such as mobile and IoT de-
vices. Except for these resource-limited systems, or where a strategic long-term migration
is needed, there is no strong reason to employ ECC over RSA based signature schemes.
In the case of our evaluations for digital signatures, beyond the self robustness of
secure hash functions used in standardized constructions (another point of security anal-
ysis), we must consider the comparative security level and efficiency for each achieved
performance, regarding the use of 3072-bit keys for RSA-based signatures and 256-bit
keys for ECC-based signatures (using curve P-256 from NIST), which is their equivalent.
It is important to notice that the security and key length of the cryptographic algo-
rithms do not really matter if an attacker can obtain the secret and private keys through
other methods. This way, we must emphasize the following: security starts and ends with
how well the keys are managed and protected, and how good is the key storage. In ad-
dition, insecure and weak algorithms implementations, bad random number generators
and various malicious attacks can also compromise security.
Finally, for the purpose of this dissertation it is interesting to discuss the use of cryp-
tographic configurations in the combination of four relevant impact factors: the compu-
tation efficiency; the bandwidth (in the case, impacting the Bluetooth communication);
the usability in the mobile environment and the relevance on government and industry
standard recommendations.
As already mentioned, cryptographic algorithms execute two relevant computations
in the process of digital signatures - signature (i.e, encryption using the private key)
and verification (i.e, decryption using the public key) - which accordingly with the given
algorithm have different performances. In general, RSA has an higher signature time than
ECC since RSA keys are significantly larger than ECC keys; and has a lower verification
time due to the fact that ECC executes more complex operations rather than RSA as
stated in literature [42]. More precisely, they tell us that in relation to the performance
or time costs at 128-bit security level, RSA is generally reported to be 10-times slower
than ECC for private key operations such as signature generation, key establishment and
key generation. The divergence in performance keeps increasing drastically as the key
length increases, for example, at 256-bit security levels, RSA (using 15,360-bit keys) can
be 50 to 100 times slower. On the contrary, for public key operations such as signature
verification, RSA does not suffer big time variations as we increase the key size, which
means that even doubling the key size the verification process is still fast compared with
signature generation. The key generation of RSA is also significantly slow compared with
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the key generation of ECC, with RSA being 100 to 1000 times slower and capable of
draining completely the battery of a wireless device when using sufficient large key sizes.
However, this may or may not be a relevant consideration to take into account in systems
that rarely generate keys. In the case of this dissertation, no protocol or functionality
requires the generation of keys frequently, therefore, it does not matter for our goals.
Regarding network bandwidth, the main concern relates to the symmetric algorithm
used for message encryption and Message Authentication Coding (MAC) for integrity
checking. For instance, small embedded system could start sessions often or the asymmetric-
based authentication could represent a big part of the overall traffic and the size of keys
and signatures would make a difference, since small key lengths do not increase the
messages length and less bandwidth is consumed. The length of the public and private
keys, and also signatures, is much shorter for ECC, for example, at 128-bit security levels,
public keys and signatures are 6-times larger for RSA compared to ECC, and private keys
are 12-times larger for RSA. As consequence, ECC has lower bandwidth demands. The
key length generally has no impact on performance, but size matters when it comes to the
cost of secure key storage. However, in our case, these differences are mitigated, because
each cryptographic configuration used for digital signatures will only depend on the size
of the secure hash of the document sent by the computer via Bluetooth to the mobile
device, and the size of the returned signature obtained. In this case, ECC has also the
advantage, because for the same level of security (128-bit) we will return a Bluetooth
packet containing 70 to 72 bytes compared with a packet of 256 bytes in the case of RSA.
For the mobile environment, we consider now the suitability and efficiency of RSA
and ECC based digital signatures with mobile phones. RSA algorithm is usually sus-
pended from use with small wireless devices, because its usage will negatively affect their
performance and consume a lot of resources such as memory and energy, delaying the
verification process [6]. In the other hand, many studies and authors in literature, already
have reported the advantages of employing ECDSA for resource-limited environments
due to its performance and security [6, 17, 42]. Attending our dissertation case and goals,
our performance evaluation helped us to gain more insight into the most suitable public-
key cryptography algorithms for a mobile environment with resource limitations (such
as memory, energy and CPU capability). In our case, the only cryptographic operation ex-
ecuted in the mobile environment is the signature generation with the private key, which
was already demonstrated that its very slow for RSA and very fast for ECC. Only in a
solution that performs signature verification in a mobile device, is ideally to employ RSA
over ECC, because verification times are significantly different from each other and RSA
scales well with the key length increasing. This way, we concluded that ECC-based digital
signatures are more effective and feasible for our mobile environment in many aspects,
since they provide a good security plus a good efficiency.
Considering for last the government and industry standard recommendations, there
is an almost endless list of new standards that are recommending and requiring the use
of public-key algorithms based on ECC rather than traditional key systems, such as RSA,
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DSA and DH. Specially, for the case of constrained environments, where we need security
without impacting severely the performance and resources. A small selection of these
standards is presented below:
• ZigBee and the complementary IEEE 802.15.4 standard: these networking stan-
dards specify the ECDSA and ECDH asymmetric algorithms as the algorithms of
choice for authentication and key management respectively in constrained environ-
ments [18]. Notice that, these standards focus on wireless networking protocols
that are built to operate over ad-hoc networks, where other wireless technologies
such as Bluetooth are less than ideal.
• Security Module PP Standards: the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI in German language) agency has published a set of standards for energy meter-
ing gateway security which specifies different cryptographic functionalities based
on ECC as the generation and verification of digital signatures and key agreement
to be employed in Smart Metering Systems [34].
• Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Standards: this set of standards documents
the choice of the automotive standards industry for elliptic curves as the algorithm
of choice for car-to-car and car-to-infrastructure communication security due to the
low power consumption and space required, and because it offers the most security
per bit of any public-key scheme [47].
• Suite B Cryptography Standards: this set of standard algorithms published by the
US government (more precisely, NSA) is approved for use in non-defense appli-
cations [63]. We must notice that currently, this standard includes only ECC for
digital signatures and key management, and RSA has been completely removed due
to various reasons described in [62].
3.4 BluetoothKSP Initialization and Setup
In this section, we group all the configuration or installation processes required to fully
use the BluetoothKSP to perform cryptographic operations executed in a smartphone
environment demanded by Windows-based applications.
Firstly, we should define or configure which Bluetooth security mechanisms (mainly,
the Pairing method), and also the usage of security enforcements, the BluetoothKSP
will provide to the Windows-based applications that use it. Secondly, we must do the
BluetoothKSP registration in the Windows OS, so the OS recognizes it as a valid Win-
dows cryptographic provider as the other installed cryptographic providers. Besides this
registration operation, the representative DLL of the BluetoothKSP must be copied to
the System32 folder of the Windows OS, where common Windows DLLs are also main-
tained [53]. Consequently, Windows starts to recognize our DLL as another Windows
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DLL. Also, it is important to note that Windows only trust DLLs that were previously
code signed. To ease this whole BluetoothKSP configuration process we could produce
a registration executable program that registers the BluetoothKSP as a KSP and copies
the respective DLL file into the System32 folder. Finally, the Initialization Protocol its
performed through the graphical WindowsCertificateManager application to accomplish
the certificates registration into the operating system with our BluetoothKSP. After these
few configurations, we are able to fully use the BluetoothKSP to sign documents remotely
using a smartphone.
3.5 Bluetooth Security Considerations and Enforcement
Bluetooth Security is a very complex domain and is very dependent on the Bluetooth
version of mobile devices, given that each version implements different security mecha-
nisms and the backward-compatibility feature always tries to provide compatibility for
low Bluetooth versions. Although, it is possible to increase the baseline security pro-
vided to communication channels between devices with low Bluetooth versions via an
Extra-layer of Security at an higher level, such as a secure Transport Layer Security (TLS)
channel. Furthermore, it is possible to discard a security enforcement as the TLS and
only use the most recent and complete version of Bluetooth (i.e, v4.2 or v5.0) that can
provide a low-energy and secure protocol for Bluetooth communications. Unfortunately,
we need mobile devices with these versions or a strong security baseline can’t be pro-
vided. These approaches to Bluetooth Security and secure communication channels are
described throughout this section.
Bluetooth Classic. In a first approach, we implemented the Bluetooth Classic proto-
col between both devices - one acting as server and the other as client - with the security
mechanisms that compose the Bluetooth baseline security. Figure 3.5 represents the es-
tablishment of the Bluetooth communication channel. Before the formation of the link,
the client device scans the local area for Bluetooth-enabled devices that are currently ac-
cepting connection requests. This procedure is called Device or Service Discovery. These
devices running Bluetooth services (through the bluetooth_accept blocking method) are
also called discoverable devices, such as our server device. Using the information ex-
changed in this process, the client device can initiate a connection with the discovered
device (invoking the bluetooth_connect method) to establish Radio Frequency Communi-
cation (RFCOMM) channels to exchange data with a selected device. Then, the Pairing
process initiates if this is the first time a connection is made and a pairing request is
automatically presented to the user according with the Pairing method used (e.g, PIN or
SSP). In this process, both devices exchange security informations (such as the security
features that each one supports), both devices establish a shared link-key to be used for
authentication and to create an encrypted connection with each other. When the devices
are paired, the informations (mainly, the security keys) are saved and can be re-used
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Figure 3.5: Bluetooth Stack Operations Flowchart.
through the Android Bluetoothy APIs, and is no longer needed to execute another Pairing
unless the devices became unpaired. This process is automatically performed when a
connection is initiated or received with the Android Bluetooth APIs. After the pairing
and connection processes are completed, the two devices start exchanging data trough
the Bluetooth socket streams: the server device invokes a blocking method (server_read)
that reads data from the input stream; the client device invokes client_write to write to
the output stream the data to send to server-side and waits for the response invoking
client_read; when the server device reads the data from the stream, executes the crypto-
graphic operation demanded and writes the response to the output stream, so the client
can receive the result from the operation. Once the session is completed, the device that
initiated the pairing request releases the channel created with the other device, but they
remain bounded to each other so the can reconnect automatically during future sessions.
In our system, there are two Bluetooth communications channels that are established:
one during the certificates configuration and other during the remote signature. In situa-
tions where both devices have high Bluetooth versions, these channels are created using
the most recent security mechanisms defined in versions 4.1, 4.2 or 5.0, such as the Secure
Connections (with Numeric Comparison) pairing mechanism required by the Security
Mode 4, which is employed by default by the Bluetooth APIs or libraries used. This
way, we can mitigate the MITM and eavesdropping attacks. Therefore, confidentiality,
authentication and integrity are provided for mobile devices that make use of Security
Mode 4 (i.e, mobile devices with Bluetooth v4.1 beyond). Although, only public data is
transmitted via Bluetooth while critical data (such as private keys) never leave the device
(i.e, the SE), it is important to use mechanisms that grant high security to achieve a more
reliable and secure solution, mainly, in the case of devices with low Bluetooth versions.
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The Pairing mechanism can be parametrizable (according with the Security Mode em-
ployed by the device) in order to grant flexibility to the solution in terms of which security
features can be used. In the Classic Bluetooth case, the supported Pairing mechanisms are
PIN Pairing (i.e, Legacy Pairing), SSP and Secure Connections (using a given association
model). Although, these mechanisms can be parametrizable for recent mobile devices,
for older devices is impossible since those devices don’t support Secure Connections or
even SSP. Also, some of these mechanisms are more secure than others as we presented
in the previous chapter. PIN Pairing is used by v2.0 or older Bluetooth devices and is
classified as insecure, SSP is used by v3.0 to v4.0 devices and despite its enforced security
algorithms has some well-known faults, and Secure Connections is used by v4.1 or recent
devices and its classified as the most secure Pairing mechanism. This problem can be
aggravated given the high use scale of old Bluetooth versions (below v4.0), which is very
high for the Android devices [20]. Yet, it is estimated that until 2023, 90% of all Blue-
tooth devices will include BLE and also the presence of Bluetooth BR/EDR, enhancing
the rapidly replacement of single-mode BR/EDR for Dual-mode radios.
Bluetooth Security Enforcement. In order to grant support for various Bluetooth ver-
sions ensuring a minimal security base for all Bluetooth mobile devices was implemented
an Extra-layer of security in our solution. This layer has the goals of avoiding to work
only with the Bluetooth security baseline and increasing the protection granted to the
connections between mobile devices with lower Bluetooth versions. Also, it is possible to
enable or activate this Extra-layer of security given the Bluetooth version of the mobile
device. This means that, for old devices we activate the Extra-layer, but for recent mobile
devices with versions equal or higher to v4.0, it has no need given that it would create an
useless overhead over the communication channel.
The security protocol or mechanism that composes the security enforcement is the
TLS protocol, which enables us to create a neutral layer between the application layer
and the network layer (in this case, the Bluetooth channel) as represented in Figure 3.6.
TLS or SSL consists in the establishment of a secure point-to-point channel where data
exchanged between two endpoints is always encrypted. Generally, this protocol provides
three security properties: authenticity, confidentiality and integrity.
The combination of TLS protocol and Bluetooth is analogous to the use of HTTPS, but
Application
Network
SSL/TLSSecurity Extra-layer
BluetoothKSP,
WindowsCertificateManager,
CertificateManager
Bluetooth
Figure 3.6: TLS/Bluetooth Stack.
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with the difference that in this case we create a secure communication channel double-
encrypted that enforces the Bluetooth Security Baseline.
Figure 3.7 represents the establishment of the TLS channel over Bluetooth. The cre-
ation of this secure link is similar to the establishment of the Bluetooth connections,
because a connection request is also executed from the client-side, and the server-side
also is blocking and waiting for these TLS connection requests. Although, in this case, the
difference is that instead of performing the Pairing process, the TLS Handshake protocol
is executed between both devices. After the creation of this secure and encrypted chan-
nel over the already encrypted Bluetooth communication channel, we can perform the
execution of a particular cryptographic operation (such as digital signature or certificate
registration). The data exchange procedure is also equal to the normal Bluetooth protocol,
but using the client_write, client_read, server_write and server_read from the TLS Protocol.
bluetooth_connect
Ti
m
e
CLIENT SERVER
return
client_tls_read
client_tls_write
server_write
bluetooth_accept
Execution of  the
Cryptographic
Operation
Client executes Device Discovery
Bluetooth Pairing
server_tls_read
TLS Handshake Protocol
tls_connect
return
Figure 3.7: TLS/Bluetooth Stack Operations Flowchart.
Bluetooth Low Energy. In a final approach we handled the second specification of
Bluetooth technology: the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), which is designed to provide
low power consumption for wireless devices that have stricter power resources such as
heart rate monitors, proximity sensors and fitness devices. Regarding the specification
protocol, BLE technology uses different protocols compared with Bluetooth Classic that
uses RFCOMM protocol, which are focused in the functionality and features of the IoT
devices. The main protocol consists in sending and retrieving small portions of data (also
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known as attributes) using the minimal bytes possible, being called as Attribute Protocol
(ATT) [19, 38]. On top of this protocol, is built a generic specification for exchanging
these attributes over a BLE secure link named Generic Attribute Profile (GATT). This
notion of profile consists in the specification of how a device works with a specific appli-
cation. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) provides various conventional profiles for
Low Energy (LE) devices, such as heart monitors and proximity sensors, and these can
implement more than one profile. This combined protocol and specification is commonly
referred as GATT/ATT.
The attribute values transmitted through the ATT are formatted as characteristics and
services that are available on a LE device working as server (or GATT server), and are
uniquely identified by a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID). A characteristic is similar
to a type or class and contains a unique value and a descriptor that specifies the value
description in a human-readable way. A service is basically a collection of characteristics.
LE devices acting as client (or GATT client) can search for services hosted in other LE
devices and read or write the characteristics values or descriptors of that service. We can
think of this protocol as a key-value mapping that is readable and/or writeable by a LE
client devices. For example, this protocol is useful for situations where IoT devices - such
as smart bands, heartbeat sensors or beacons - are constantly measuring metrics such as
heart rate, temperature or proximity, or are simply hosting important information that a
further LE client device can query to know the values of those metrics.
Before establishing a connection, GATT client or server devices adopt one of two
roles: Peripheral or Central. A device in the first role is responsible for advertising
its service to other LE devices and a device in the second role scans, searching for LE
advertisements. For example, if a given device wants to communicate data to other
LE devices, it may start broadcasting advertisements and a second device that wants to
received them, starts looking for that service advertisements in order to further write or
read the service information (i.e, the characteristics values). Notice that, is required to
have both roles for establishing a BLE connection, because two devices in Peripheral role
or two devices that could only support Central role can’t talk to each other.
In relation to the two Bluetooth communication links existing in our model, only
one was created using the BLE technology, which is the channel established during the
certificates configuration. Because this link is based on Bluetooth versions that include
LE (i.e, versions 4.1, 4.2 and 5.0), it can also be created using the most secure mechanisms
available, such as the Secure Connections (with Numeric Comparison) Pairing method,
providing the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of Security Mode 4.
3.6 Summary Remarks
In the beginning of this chapter we presented an overview of the system model and a
vulnerability analysis considering some of the existing threats in both computer and
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mobile side. We defined a thread model where the packets transmitted can be tampered,
the Secure Element (SE) can be replaced by a malicious one, root exploits can clean all
the SE cryptographic content and a corrupted SE can produce incorrect data to be signed
by the user. Given the adversary model, we described in more detail our architectural
components and how they relate with each other by exchanging information, for example,
executing protocols such as the certificates configuration (Initialization Protocol) and the
remote signatures execution (Signature Protocol).
Next, we defined the principal component of the KSPs architecture (i.e, the CNG
Router), which is the responsible for the management of different KSPs registered in the
Windows OS and the access to all cryptographic content of the respective KSP demanded
by desktop applications. Our BluetoothKSP is a third-party KSP, represented as a Dy-
namic Link Library (DLL), that implements a common interface from which the CNG
Router can invoke function implementations.
The primary cryptographic operation provided by our mobile crypto provider is sig-
nature generation using different parametrizable digital signature schemes with different
performance gains, although other operations, as the KSP pre-operations, may be neces-
sary to complete the signature operation when using different desktop applications. We
also presented, the certificate import operation in the Windows (only the public key) and
Android OS (both public and private keys).
Initialization and setup of the BluetoothKSP includes the registration of the provider
in the Windows OS to be available to the CNG Router and the placement of the KSP DLL
in the Windows file system.
Finally, we presented the Bluetooth security mechanisms employed and parametriz-
able by our solution, such as the Pairing method, and the enforcement techniques, such
as TLS, used to increase the communication channel security and protection. As an alter-
native to the Bluetooth Classic specification, we employed the secure and energy-efficient
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) for devices with more recent Bluetooth versions, avoiding
the need of adopting costly security enforcements.
Given the risks and threats that exist in our mobile-computer environment and how
our solution can be used to mitigate them, in the next chapter, we discuss the imple-
mentation of the system model and architecture, addressing a prototype to be used for
experimental evaluation.
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Implementation
In this chapter, we present the implementation details and decisions related to the proto-
typing effort of the system model proposed in Chapter 3. This way, we start by presenting
an overview of the developed prototype (in Section 4.1), followed by a description of the
software building blocks and technologies used by the prototype (in Section 4.2). Then,
it is shown the development technologies and environment used to build this prototype
(in Section 4.3), and the prototype implementation effort (in Section 4.4). The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the issues that arose during prototype implementation
and related observations (in Section 4.5).
4.1 Prototype Overview
Following the design of the BluetoothKSP system model proposed, we implemented a
prototype in which a mobile phone acts as a crypto provider, enabled with two Blue-
tooth communication modes and with parametrizations for digital signature schemes,
Bluetooth Pairing methods and Security Enforcement, and being possible to be used
transparently with real Windows desktop applications.
As said before, we intended to develop a prototype with strict existing software build-
ing blocks. Regarding the computer operating system, we developed the prototype to run
on a Windows machine, since it is required the usage of the Cryptography API: Next Gen-
eration (CNG) to implement the BluetoothKSP. In relation to the smartphone operating
system, we adopted the Android OS due to its high usage rate in today’s mobile market
and also because Android has a flexible way to communicate with the smartphone’s Se-
cure Element (SE) through the Android Keystore System. For the Bluetooth technology,
the prototype is based on the Bluetooth versions 4.1 and 5.0, because are, respectively,
the versions of the computer and smartphone adopted for development and testing.
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In practice, this prototype was developed essentially as three software programs,
representing the main building blocks or components of the system proposed:
• CertificateManager: a mobile application that acts as a certificate manager and rep-
resents the remote BluetoothKSP, which waits for certificate registration and signa-
tures requests incoming from Windows desktop applications;
• WindowsCertificateManager: a UI-based desktop application in the Windows-side to
import certificates requested to the mobile application;
• BluetoothKSP: the proxy Dynamic Link Library (DLL) responsible for redirecting
the signature requests from Windows desktop applications to the mobile applica-
tion.
In addition to these components, our prototype also includes the implementation of
a benchmark client that executes certificate registration and/or digital signatures opera-
tions. And can be parametrizable in terms of public-key certificates, signature schemes,
Bluetooth-related security mechanisms, tls-based security enforcement, Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) and test documents with different sizes for system validation and experi-
mental observations. These benchmark clients will be later detailed.
4.2 Building Blocks and Technology
As a starting point for the development of the prototype, was required to choose which
technologies were to be used to develop the main building blocks. This included choosing
the technology on which we would implementing the WindowsCertificateManager and the
CertificateManager application, as the BluetoothKSP library must be strictly a Windows
DLL. The following Table 4.1 describes the technologies used for each on of these building
blocks. In the next subsections, we describe how the building blocks in each computing
side were implemented using these technologies.
Table 4.1: Technologies of the Building Blocks.
Building Blocks Technologies
Server-side CertificateManager Android app (in Java)
Client-side WindowsCertificateManager .NET app (in C#)
BluetoothKSP DLL library (in C++)
4.2.1 Android-Side or Server-Side
On the Server-Side, the CertificateManager application, or remote BluetoothKSP, was
implemented using the Java programming language and the Android package manager
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Gradle, targeting smartphones with Android 7.0 (Nougat) or later operating systems. The
adopted Java version was 8 and the Gradle version was 4.5.1.
All support libraries used in this application to develop the functionalities belong
to the Android Framework, including the Bluetooth APIs for creating and managing
the Bluetooth Service, and the Keystore System API for storing, accessing and manage
cryptographic data and execute cryptographic functions. The adopted crypto providers to
satisfy these cryptographic demands were the AndroidKeystore and the Spongy/Bouncy
Castle provider, being the second added to the Android project as a Gradle dependency.
As an exception-case, this second provider was used to enable the possibility of using
digital signatures schemes that are not supported or were impossible to execute in the
desired way by the AndroidKeystore provider, such as DSA and RSA-PSS. Also, it was
used to implement the Security Enforcement, i.e, the server-side of the TLS/Bluetooth
secure channel.
As a sub-component of this application, there is Bluetooth Service supporting Classic
(using RFCOMM protocol) and LE specifications (using GATT/ATT protocol), which is
simply a thread running in the background of the application waiting or listening for
Bluetooth connection requests from the WindowsCertificateManager application or the
BluetoothKSP library. This service is uniquely identified with a UUID and only applica-
tions with its knowledge will send connection requests successfully. In the prototype,
this service is always initiated when the application starts, but the main goal would be to
put this Bluetooth service running in the background of the Android OS along with other
system services. As a result, end users wouldn’t always need to have the application run-
ning to complete signature processes and through notifications they would know when a
signature operation is requested. In the case of BLE, there is a slightly different, which is
the Bluetooth Service advertises the service that it is providing and other client devices
must scan for these advertisements to request some operation to the service.
The server-side implementation of the TLS/Bluetooth secure channel was done through
the Bluetooth sockets already being used in the Bluetooth Service, or more precisely,
through the input and output streams from these sockets. After the server device accept
a connection request, the socket streams are initialized and passed to our TLS service,
where is executed an accept call on the input stream to wait for TLS handshake requests
from clients that invoked a TLS connection request on the output stream from the client-
side. After the handshake is completed, the server device start listening for data in the
encrypted input stream to read.
This mobile application is able to respond to certificate and digital signature requests
via Bluetooth as it acts as a cryptographic provider, import certificates and respective
privates keys in local .p12 files into the Android OS and display of the current certificates
installed. Beside these main functionalities, it is possible to configure the application to
work with BLE-based communication channels or TLS/Bluetooth secure links. For imple-
mentation and testing purposes, this configuration is done through a config.properties
file, but in a real deployed application, it would be configured in the settings menu of the
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Android application.
4.2.2 Windows-Side or Client-Side
On the Client-Side, the WindowsCertificateManager application was implemented using
the .NET Framework and the C# programming language with the goal of providing a
graphical and intuitive application to enable users to manage their certificates (i.e, visu-
alizing them or registering new ones). The versions adopted were, respectively, 4.7.2 and
7.0 for .NET Framework and C#.
In relation to the UI and aesthetics part of the implementation, we adopted the Win-
dows Presentation Foundation (WPF)1 Framework, which is part of .NET . This Windows
UI framework enables the creation of desktop client applications with a broad set of de-
velopment features such as controls, graphics, layout, data binding and security. Other
remark is that WPF uses the Application Markup Language (XAML) to create the layouts
for the application.
This WPF desktop client application includes as support libraries the 32Feet for the
Bluetooth Classic client-side implementation and the Bouncy Castle for the client-side
implementation of the TLS/Bluetooth secure channel. As we used .NET Framework, these
dependencies were added to the WPF application project as NuGet packages. Notice that,
we adopted a third-party Bluetooth library to enable the use of Windows 7 or 8 as the
operating system of the client computer due to the fact that the most recent Bluetooth
APIs in .NET and Windows are only supported in Windows 10 OS, because Microsoft
is fully moving to Universal Windows Platform (UWP) applications and the widespread
adoption of Windows 10, which can be impractical for many developers in many ways.
However, the 32Feet library does not support yet the BLE technology or, more precisely,
the GATT/ATT protocol specification. Therefore, we had to adopt one of these new
Bluetooth APIs in order to implement the BLE support in our prototype. As consequence,
the LE feature will only work on our solution if a Windows 10 computer is used, besides
the implicit restriction that the devices involved in the Bluetooth communication must
support LE technology.
The client-side implementation of the TLS/Bluetooth secure channel was also done
through the Bluetooth sockets streams, where the client device first sends a connection
request to a server device with the target service, obtaining a socket stream if the con-
nection is successfully established, and then sends a TLS connection request via the TLS
Service, initiating the TLS handshake with the server device. After the TLS handshake is
completed, the client can write the data to the new encrypted stream.
The Bluetooth Classic client-side implementation (using RFCOMM protocol) consists,
firstly, on discovering Bluetooth devices and, secondly, connecting to the devices that pro-
vide the target service represented by a given UUID, for then exchange information. For
example, in this case the WPF application sends a connection request for the certificate
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/wpf/
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import operation and the server retrieves the set of certificates to be selected and im-
ported into the Windows OS. Regarding the implementation of BLE (using GATTT/ATT
protocol), the WindowsCertificateManager application scans for LE advertisements of a
specific service, and when it finds the device advertising that service, it sends a connection
request and then a request for read or write a given characteristic/attribute.
Due to some implementations issues regarding the certificate import operation in
C# code, we had to implement it using C++. This is possible because .NET Framework
cryptographic functions usually redirect the function call to CNG functions that are im-
plemented in C++. This means that, in most of the cases, a given sequence of operations in
C# code can be reproduced in C++ code. Our certificate import operation implemented in
C++ was encapsulated in an intermediary DLL to be accessed by C# code. The sequence
of instructions performed by this operation was already explained before, but in general
consists of configuring the cryptographic provider of the certificate private key as our
BluetoothKSP, creating only a link without storing any key material, and registering the
certificate in the Windows Certificate Store.
In the other hand, the BluetoothKSP library was implemented using the C++ program-
ming language as any other DLL library in the Windows OS, which also needs to be
registered as a valid Windows cryptographic provider. The version employed was version
17 and the compiler used was Clang. This library follows and implements the CNG call-
back functions for KSPs as defined previously, but only using some of them to complete
digital signature operations via Bluetooth and using a SE as the real crypto provider.
Besides CNG and CAPI library support at C++ level, other important C++ libraries
were used to accomplish the required functionalities, such as the Windows Sockets in-
terface (or WinsockAPI v2.2) library to conduct the implementation of the Bluetooth
Classic client-side (using RFCOMM protocol2) and the Botan library3 which offered a way
to enable the implementation of a TLS/Bluetooth secure channel. Related with the BLE
support at this lower-level technology, was adopted the same library as in the C# code
(i.e, WinRT APIs, but implemented in C++) to establish a BLE link between the computer
and smartphone. In this case, the use of this library restricts the use of BLE technology
to perform digital signatures only with Windows 10 computers.
Additionally to the BluetoothKSP library implementation, we developed a small Blue-
toothKSP configuration client (using C++) to perform the registration of the BluetoothKSP
in the Windows OS and to validate the implementation of the BluetoothKSP functions.
This client program was also based from a configuration client provided by the Windows
Cryptographic Provider Development Kit.
2https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/bluetooth/windows-sockets-support-for-
bluetooth
3https://botan.randombit.net/
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4.3 Other Development Tools
Our development environment included computing devices such as Windows 10 desktop
computers with support for Bluetooth connections (though a Bluetooth interface) and
Android smartphones with embedded-SEs. We consider that the intended solution must
be designed and developed for the support of other Bluetooth versions (classic or BLE-
based), to cover the majority of current devices in the market. In [20] it was announced
that 100% of all smartphones, tablets and laptops shipped in 2018 (estimated in 2.1
billion devices) include Bluetooth natively, predominantly with Bluetooth v4.0 and v5.0.
We evaluated in our development how the current Android platforms include support for
the Bluetooth network stacks, and how we can transparently support different Bluetooth
versions. Therefore, in our approach we guided our developments possibly looking for
the more representative platforms in the Portuguese Android market today: Android
OS 6 (Marshmallow), 7 (Nougat) and 8 (Oreo) versions, trying to obtain data from the
Portuguese operators or from other possible sources.
4.4 Implementation Effort
In terms of implementation effort, the whole source code of the three different software
projects developed has a total of 26.444 lines of code (loc) as shown in Table 4.2. The
Android and .NET applications, which were developed from zero, resulted in around
12,630 and 3,422 lines of code, respectively. The BluetoothKSP was implemented based
on a Sample KSP available through the Cryptographic Provider Development Kit from
Microsoft. The addition of new features and changes to the original functions represented
a total of 1,136 lines of code, since the original codebase from the Sample KSP was totalled
with 9,256 lines of code.
Table 4.2: Prototype Implementation Effort in terms of Lines of Code (LoC).
Building Block LoC
CertificateManager 12,630
WindowsCertificateManager 3,422
BluetoothKSP 10,392
Total 26.444
In developing this solution, the difficulty felt was somewhat high given the numerous
technologies, programming languages and languages paradigms used and the purpose
of bringing these different software and hardware components together into a flexible
computer-mobile cryptographic solution. Furthermore, some of these technologies have
not allowed us to fully meet some of the initial objectives due to the lack of technology
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support or the inability of these technologies to provide the means to implement the
required features. In the next section, we describe some of these situations in more detail.
4.5 Implementation Issues and Final Remarks
There are some final issues related with the building blocks and their components that
must be emphasized as relevant implementation concerns, when addressing the devel-
oped prototype.
The first issue was the registration of a new certificate on the Windows OS with
our BluetoothKSP as the cryptographic provider of the certificate private key, because
there are few examples of how to do this with the Cryptography API: Next Generation
(CNG) using C# on the Web. Hence, to solve this problem, we had to implement this
operation in C++, where more samples and better documentation are available to assist
the development of the operation, and in C# code call it through an intermediate library
that has the actual implementation of the certificate registration function.
Other problem was knowing which cryptographic algorithms the desktop application
with signature demands were requiring when calling the BluetoothKSP signature func-
tion. Specially, which hash and public-key algorithm was being used. The point of this
is that the remote BluetoothKSP needs to know which digital signature scheme must be
used in the signature generation process on the Secure Element (SE) context. This issue
was easily solved by appending the respective algorithm OIDs in the Bluetooth packet
sent during the signature process as seen before.
An recurrent obstacle in the prototype development was without doubts the interop-
erability between the computer-side (C#, C++ and .NET) and the mobile-side (Android
and Java). For example, the DSA and ECDSA based signature schemes have different
signature format on each platform. All Microsoft technology employs the IEEE P1363
signature standard format [46] while Java employs the DER format such as OpenSSL.
This constraint has been overcome by converting from DER to P1363 format after the
signature generation in the Android side. Related with this issue was also the format
used in the Bluetooth-based communications, i.e, which format is necessary to encapsu-
late multiple informations that need to be sent to the other endpoint. This format needed
to be generic to the three building blocks for ease of reading and writing data that its
differently formatted in each platform, so, JSON-formatted messages or packets were
employed to prevent interoperability issues. For example, in Java, the bytes are signed
while in C# and C++ the bytes are unsigned.
Regarding the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) implementation, we faced some issues
when sending write requests for a given characteristic to a target service. In the first
place, the write request function that enables a responsive execution, i.e, a waiting for
a response from the server-side, was not working correctly given successive errors. In
the second place, the BLE packets exchanged are so small that it is almost impossible
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to execute digital signatures, unless the signature result size does not surpasses the BLE
maximum packet length.
A relevant future issue from the Windows support is the common generalization that
Microsoft is doing of using UWP applications and Windows 10 APIs for the future appli-
cations in order to remove completely the use of older Windows operating systems.
Overall, this solution implementation is complex, mainly in terms of interoperability,
and is very dependent from the cryptographic support from the employed platforms,
in the sense that is not easy and direct to employ a new cryptographic algorithm in the
system since we have to implement the support for it in the different components and
some of them may not support it at all through their respective libraries or APIs. Also,
we have to be careful with the data exchange between these different platforms and how
it is processed.
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Experimental Evaluation
In this chapter, it is presented the experimental evaluation of the prototype implemen-
tation described in Chapter 4. Several experiments were made and conducted using a
well-defined testing environment and a set of parametrizations which included different
hash functions, public-key algorithms, key sizes and security enforcements. First, we
describe the components of the test bench environment (in Section 5.1) and present a
test bench to measure the cost of the configuration phase of our solution (in Section 5.2).
Then, we present a use-case of our solution with conventional Windows applications (in
Section 5.3) and proceed to present the results of the experimental benchmarks regarding
digital signatures (in Section 5.4). Next, we present the performance evaluation of Blue-
tooth, more precisely, the Low Energy (LE) impact on the execution of digital signatures
and also the benchmark observations on the overhead imposed by the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) enforcement (in Section 5.5). Additionally, we present other validation
metrics, such as packaging, memory usage and energy consumption (in Sections 5.6). For
last, a brief summary on the results obtained is presented (in Section 5.7).
5.1 Test bench Environment
In this section we present the generic test bench environment, including the system
topology, used resources, test assumptions and test conditions, and also the technical
specifications of the computational systems used.
5.1.1 Generic Test bench
The testing environment for evaluating our prototype, was mounted using the same com-
puting devices presented in the previous Chapters, more precisely, a Windows computer
and an Android smartphone. We set up the following topology between the two: the
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computer was hosting and executing the Windows CertificateManager application and the
Benchmark clients, besides the installed and pre-configured BluetoothKSP; the mobile
phone was hosting and running the CertificateManager application, working as a tiny
server. These two devices were positioned less than ten centimetres apart.
In terms of resources for testing, we used a set of sample documents (i.e, .pdf and .docx
files) with different sizes (more precisely, ranging from 1 MB to 100 MB) as signature
test objects and a set of certificates with keys of one of the three different public-key
algorithms employed(i.e, RSA, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and DSA) to be used
in the signing operation. The range of documents size was chosen based on the samples
obtained from an analysis of documents used by 43 users in a typical office environment
- such as in Multicert1. Regarding the certificates, we used the KeyStore Explorer 2 tool
to generate RSA, ECC and DSA self-signed certificates, distributing them in the form
of Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS)#12 files to user’s smartphones, so they
can import the certificates into the Android OS. It is important to notice that, these
certificates are self-signed and, consequently, are not accepted as trusted by common
applications and services, they are just for development and testing purposes. In normal
cases, the certificates are distributed to users via Certification Authorities (CAs), which
issue trusted certificates signed by the CA itself and other root CAs that authenticate the
credibility of the issuing CA. In our testing environment, we assume that certificates have
already been obtained by conventional ways.
To obtain better observations and results during the experiments, we executed all
benchmarks in a clean environment where only our applications were running and we
disabled some features which imply user interaction in order to remove the entropy when
measuring the metrics. For example, the Bluetooth Pairing mechanism was already ex-
ecuted and the devices were paired when the benchmarks were running, the Bluetooth
device discovery was configured to search for a specific device and the notifications from
CertificateManager to user to accept certificate and signature requests were turned-off. In
the case of signature requests, this would imply inserting the password of the private key
stored inside the Secure Element (SE) through a PIN or Fingerprint based authentication.
Regarding the Bluetooth security features such as the pairing method, algorithms for
key generation and key establishment and others, they were also negotiated before any
pairing or data communication occurs, but after the Bluetooth devices were selected. In
this case, having one device with Bluetooth v4.0 and other with v5.0 implies the usage
of security features from v4.0 due to the backward-compatibility feature of Bluetooth
devices, as explained before. In this case, the finite security baseline agreed between the
two devices included the usage of Security Mode 4, which uses SSP as pairing method with
P-192 ECC algorithm and HMAC-SHA-256 hash function, and employs the association
1https://www.multicert.com/pt/
2https://keystore-explorer.org/
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model named Numeric Comparison. As said before, with this Bluetooth security baseline
we achieve an authenticated pairing and key establishment processes to setup a secure
channel under mutual authentication.
5.1.2 Software Environments and Devices
The following Table 5.1 summarizes the technical specifications of each computational
system.
Table 5.1: Technical Specifications of the Test bench Environment.
Windows Computer Android Smartphone
OS Windows 10 Professional Android 7.0 Nougat
CPU Intel Core i5-3230M 2.60GHz Qualcomm MSM8998 Snapdragon 835
RAM 8GB 4GB
Model Toshiba Pórtege R930-17U Galaxy S8
Bluetooth 4.0 (with LE) 5.0 (with LE)
5.2 Setup and Benchmarking
In this section, it is presented the configuration phase (or setup) benchmark and the
measured performance results - in terms of latency - of our solution using a variable
number of certificates and Bluetooth Classic without any security enforcements.
This benchmark consists in the evaluation of the impact of configuring the certificates
for registration (or import) in the Windows OS before starting the execution of digital
signatures. The main goal of this benchmark was to obtain the latency of the Bluetooth
channel and the time taken by the Windows OS to execute the cryptographic operations
associated with the certificate registration in this phase. Plus, this test allowed us to
measure how much time is taken to validate certification chains, considering also the
possibility of existing intermediary certificates already revoked.
To perform this benchmark, we implemented a small Setup Benchmark client which
executes a sequence of certificate registration requests to the CertificateManager (i.e, the
Initialization Protocol) over the same number of certificates to register existing in the
smartphone environment. This sequence of requests or benchmark runs was done with
the intent of obtaining the average and standard deviation of latency. It is important that
the chosen number of benchmark runs is high so that statistically unique points or effects
can be discarded and the uncertainty principle can be reduced, for example, 20 runs as
in our case. Regarding the number of certificates, was used a set of 3, 5 and 10 certificates.
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The results from this experiment are shown in Figure 5.1. This graph (or Boxplot)
illustrates the distribution of latency values obtained from benchmark runs based on a
five number summary (minimum, first quartile(Q1), median, third quartile(Q3) and max-
imum). Additionally, we can estimate the standard deviation by looking at the skewness
of the central rectangle. As we can observe, we achieved an overall low latency, more
precisely, less than half a second on average to complete a certificate registration with
a variable number of certificates and only obtaining few outlier samples (i.e, individual
high latency peaks). Only with 10 certificates, the latency is higher than 0.5 seconds. The
existing outliers are due to the fact that the first connection that is established between
the devices for each different number of certificates takes longer than the subsequent ones.
This is because, an high number of BluetoothKSP functions are invoked as pre-operations
before the certificate registration. As Figure 5.1 suggests, by varying the number of certifi-
cates, the latency in general tends to increase as the size of exchanged Bluetooth packets
tends to be higher, as we expected. However, the variation isn’t noticeable.
Figure 5.1: Setup for Benchmarking.
For better understanding of what composes the total latency, we divided it into two
relevant temporal intervals (i.e, time chunks) - the Bluetooth Round-Trip-Time (RTT) and
the certificate import duration - and measured how high was the percentage of each time
chunk in the total latency. Note that, other meaningless times while executed auxiliary
functions and computations are discard and not take into account for the total latency,
only the measuring of these two relevant periods of times was done. Table 5.2 presents the
average values of the components in the observed latency. Bluetooth RTT keeps rounding
the same values, not varying to much even when increasing the number of certificates to
exchange. Certificate import time also increases, but more significantly as it can double
the time consumed. As such, we can conclude (on average) that approximately 70% of
the setup time corresponds to time consumed while exchanging small data packets via
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Bluetooth, producing the so called Bluetooth overhead. However, when increasing the
number of certificates, this overhead can be reduced to proximately 50%.
Table 5.2: Latency of Certificate Imports
Total latency (s)
# Certs Bluetooth RTT Cert Import
3 0.269 0.065
5 0.325 0.118
10 0.358 0.253
The following Figure 5.2 presents the latency results from the Setup Benchmark us-
ing certificates containing certificate chains. We can observe that the latency increases
because the import function must import the certificate chain of each certificate. In
this case we used certificates with a chain containing a total of 3 certificates (including
the root certificate itself), as consequence, a certificate import process, in reality, is a
3-certificate import process. For example, when importing 5 certificates retrieved from
the smartphone, in fact, we are performing an import operation of 15 certificates.
Figure 5.2: Setup for Benchmarking of Certificate Chains.
In a perspective of human time perception, the measured Bluetooth overhead is mean-
ingless to an user, although in general it can perceive time differences until 20-30 mil-
liseconds depending on some factors [32]. As such, the average 0.6 seconds obtained as
the setup latency measured is a small time cost that users are willing to pay (or wait),
which can be almost considered as instantaneous and provides a feeling of pleasure to the
users. However, in real use cases where the users only need to install certificates one time
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per different computers to further execute signature operations, the real observed latency
will be the outliers’ values (i.e, approximately 1 to 2.5 seconds) due to the pre-operations’
slowness. Although, these values continue to be irrelevant for common users. Thus, we
can conclude that even using Bluetooth as a wireless communication channel to exchange
information during the setup phase, this configuration is not an heavy process in terms
of time cost and that the Bluetooth overhead would not be a big bother to people. Yet,
it is not a flexible process to further accomplish digital signatures, because it implies
that this manual configuration must happen, for each new computer, before the computa-
tion of digital signatures through Bluetooth, between that computer and the smartphone
containing the certificates and respective private keys.
5.3 Use of BluetoothKSP with Conventional Applications
In this section, we describe some use cases of our BluetoothRemoteKSP with conventional
Windows desktop applications. It is described the observations that were made and
the results obtained regarding the transparency validation of our solution. With theses
qualitative experiments, we intended to observe how much our solution is transparent
to the conventional applications that make use of it, i.e, how many different applications
can use our BluetoothRemoteKSP to achieve their digital signature demands. Alongside
the toy-application already adopted (Acrobat Reader), we selected two more applications
to conduct this transparency experiment - such as the Microsoft Word and Microsoft
Outlook applications.
5.3.1 Adobe Acrobat
In the case of Acrobat Reader, it offers users a way to protect pdf files through signatures
using certificates from the Windows Certificate Store [2]. This feature is provided as a tool
called “Certificates“ among others. The Acrobat Reader digital signatures are performed
by selecting the “Certificates“ feature from the available tools of the application, where
is prompted a list of installed and validated Windows certificates to select which one the
user pretends to use to perform the signature. When selecting a certificate previously
installed through our Certificate Manager application, Acrobat Reader will invoke our
BluetoothKSP to complete the cryptographic operation. For this test, we performed the
execution of RSA, ECDSA and DSA based signatures successfully with the key lengths
presented before. RSA-PSS based signatures are not possible to perform in this context
or application, because Adobe Reader does not provides any way or feature to enable the
user to choose the padding to use in the case of RSA.
5.3.2 Microsoft Word and Outlook
Microsoft Word also enables users to add digital signatures to docx files [55]. This fea-
ture is provided in the options separator with the name "Protect this document". When
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selected, the list of certificates installed in the operating system is shown, so the user can
select the certificate to use in the signature process of the document. However, Microsoft
Word digital signatures are performed differently from Acrobat Reader, i.e, the sequence
of pre-operations invoked from our BluetoothKSP is different. For example, Microsoft
Word calls the method KSPEnumAlgorithms to retrieve and show to the user the list of
certificates existing in the Windows certificate store and KSPExportKey in order to obtain
the public key to execute the verification operation. For this Word test, we only executed
successfully RSA signatures since ECDSA and DSA signatures are strongly dependent
from the implementation of the KSPExportKey function of the BluetoothKSP, which was
left to implement in future work.
Similarly to Microsoft Word digital signatures feature, Microsoft Outlook enables
users to add digital signatures to outgoing messages or emails [56]. Plus, provides the
possibility to encrypt emails’ contents and attachments. Although, in the case of Outlook,
the signatures feature is provided in a different way, i.e, before creating a digital signature,
the user must first configure the signing certificate and the algorithms (hash and encryp-
tion) that desires to be used. Then, when the user creates a new email and hits the send
button, the signature is generated automatically with the signing certificate previously
configured. In the moment of the email creation, the user only chooses the appearance
of the signature, since the signing certificate must be configured always first. The certifi-
cates feature is available in the “Trust Center“ separator which exists in the options menu.
Under “Trust Center“ menu, exists another separator named “Email Security“, where we
can import/export and manage our certificates (or Digital IDs) and all security settings
related. In terms of functions invoked from our BluetoothKSP, Outlook behaves identical
to Word calling also the functions KSPEnumAlgorithms and KSPExportKey, which is com-
prehensive because both applications are owned by the same company (i.e, Microsoft).
For this Outlook test, we successfully signed emails only using RSA-based signatures with
the same reason described in Word experiment.
5.4 Evaluation of BluetoothKSP Digital Signatures
In this section, we present the experimental benchmarks on digital signatures and the
performance results (also in terms of latency) of our solution, using a set of parametriza-
tions that include secure hash functions, key lengths of public-key algorithms, and digital
signature schemes and security enforcements.
These benchmarks relate to the tests made to measure the latency of the BluetoothKSP
supported digital signatures using different combinations of parametrizations. Our goal
with these tests, beside measuring latency, is to compare key sizes, hash functions, types
of signatures and even the time chunks that compose the total latency of executing a
digital signature, as it was done in Section 5.2.
To conducted these benchmarks, we implemented a Signature Benchmark client that
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executes a sequence of digital signatures using a given certificate over the set of sam-
ple variable documents with a given signature algorithm defined through the certificate
public-key algorithm and a hash function. With this client we pretend to simulate a Win-
dows desktop application that communicates with our BluetoothRemoteKSP to complete
digital signature processes. After the execution of a predefined number of signatures (i.e,
benchmark runs) for one document, we calculate the average latency and the standard
deviation. This step is repeated for each test document, which in our case are a group of
5 with sizes of 1MB, 5MB, 20MB, 50MB and 100MB, respectively. As in the setup bench-
marking, we also executed 20 runs of signing requests for each test to discard floating
points and obtain a consistent average latency.
It is also worth to note that each first benchmark run always takes longer than the
subsequent ones due to the higher number of BluetoothKSP pre-operations that are ex-
ecuted before the signing operation. When the subsequent runs are executing, some of
the pre-operations results are already cached by the provider in memory, so there is no
need to execute them again and the signature process will have a lower latency. Yet, these
first runs are not visible in the result graphs since we are interested in the average results
of the execution of multiple signature runs. However, some of these outliers can be seen
through the Boxplots that will be presented.
5.4.1 Client-side Latency Observations
For a first benchmark, our objective was to compare the secure hash functions available
in the SHA-2 hash algorithm family with each other to measure the impact of each hash
function in the signature process. This comparison is extensively discussed in past and
current literature and many experiments were already done [35, 39, 52], although, we are
interested to know in which ways the hash functions could influence our solution. The
results obtained from this experiment are illustrated in Figure 5.3, which shows the total
average latency of digital signatures, using a specific hash function over a specific docu-
ment size. Regarding the test conditions, we used a well-known public-key algorithm, i.e,
the RSA algorithm with 2048-bit keys, and the set of documents described previously.
At first sight, the results clearly confirms the intuition that when the document size
increases, the average latency also increases for each hash function, but slightly in the
case of SHA-256. We can see that (1) for smaller documents below and up to 5MB, the
latency is stable for all hash functions; (2) the SHA-384 and SHA-512 perform worse
when the document size increases and always side by side; and (3) the SHA-256 shows a
good performance for all documents size.
Besides this average of total latency for each hash function and document size, it is
also important to have a good indication of how the latency values obtained from the
benchmark runs are distributed, as done in the previous section. This distribution is
illustrated in Figure 5.4. Notice that, in this Boxplot the latency values include the runs
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Figure 5.3: Latency of Secure Hash Functions and Variable Document Sizes.
for every document size used. The results show that SHA-384 and SHA-512 have the
highest range of values and the highest latency values, reaching to maximums of almost
9 seconds to execute a digital signature. But remember, all the singular or outlier points
correspond to the first execution and in this case, we only focus on the median values (i.e,
the green lines inside the boxes in Figure. 5.4). In general, we can achieve an average
latency independently of the document size of 1 and 2 seconds for SHA-256 and SHA-384
or SHA-256, respectively.
Figure 5.4: Latency Specifically Induced by Secure Hash Functions.
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In a second benchmark, we intended to understand how much the key size of the
cryptographic algorithms would influence the signature process time in relation with
the document size. This way, we started by comparing the key sizes of the RSA and the
ECC based algorithms in order to know what key length may imply in latency with our
solution. Many authors in literature [8, 42] already have documented that larger key
lengths increase execution times. As consequence, it is expected that they will increase
the overall latency in our solution environment. In this experiment, we decided to put
aside the DSA because it shares some similarities with RSA in terms of key length and
performance in general [8, 71]. Figure 5.5 shows the experiment results of RSA with
three different key sizes (1024, 3072 and 4096 bits) and ECDSA with three different NIST
curves (P-256, P-384 and P-521), over a specific document size. For this test case, we
choose SHA-256 to be used on the digital signature, which is the hash function measured
with best performance in the previous benchmark.
In general, the results show that the total latency tends to increase with the key size
and the document size, as expected. This increase in latency is mostly consequence of
the key size, since with larger keys the signature execution time quickly rises, delaying
the transmission of Bluetooth packets. The time required for this operation increases
for both algorithms, more significantly for RSA due to the larger keys comparing with
ECDSA, although the results for both algorithms are very similar. This is due to the
fact that the verification execution for ECDSA takes longer than RSA and also increases
with the key size since ECDSA executes more complex operations, inversely, to the signa-
ture execution. Thus, the two algorithms have both heavy cryptographic operations that
increase the latency in similar way. These observations can be seen in the next sub-section.
Similarly to the previous benchmarks, we illustrate the distribution of latency val-
ues through a Boxplot for each of the cryptographic algorithms used, in Figure 5.6. The
results suggests that, the median value oscillates between 1 and 1.5 seconds (for RSA
and ECDSA, respectively) and the values dispersion is similar in each algorithm between
key sizes, except in the case o RSA-4096 and ECDSA-521. For these last algorithms, the
maximum value easily surpasses the 3 seconds and the median value is slightly above
the median of the other algorithms. Our results lead us to conclude that RSA-3072 and
ECDSA-256 have the best performances providing the same level of security.
For the third benchmark, we present the performance comparison of the adopted
digital signature schemes with the corresponding key length in terms of security, i.e, the
RSA key size equivalent to the ECC key size in terms of the security level that they offer.
As previously discussed, RSA or even DSA based encryption needs larger key size while
ECC-based encryption requires significantly smaller key size for the same level of secu-
rity. Opposite to the previous benchmark test, we decided to run an experiment which
includes the DSA algorithm using a key length equivalent in terms of security level to
the RSA and ECDSA with the intent of testing this algorithm with our solution. However,
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(a) Latency of RSA and Variable Document Sizes.
(b) Latency of ECC and Variable Document Sizes.
Figure 5.5: Comparison with Different Public-key Cryptography Algorithms and Variable
Key Sizes.
this algorithm is no longer supported by Android mobile phones due to attacks against
cryptography constructions, for example, SHA-1. As such, we stored a DSA certificate
inside a local PKCS#12 file (in the application resources) to simulate a provisional key
store. Consequently, the private keys are not stored in a secure location as in the SE
and can be compromised, therefore, it is not recommended to employ this workaround
in real-world applications. The experiment results for the supported digital signature
algorithms are illustrated in Figure 5.7. These benchmarks were also conducted using
SHA-256 as the hash function of the signature algorithms.
Surprisingly, the results present RSA as the algorithm with best performance in gen-
eral for all documents size, even performing better than ECC. This seems somewhat
contradictory to what we discussed earlier, that the signature generation time of ECC is
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(a) Latency of RSA.
(b) Latency of ECC.
Figure 5.6: Performance of RSA and ECDSA Signatures.
generally faster than the signature generation time of RSA. In the next sub-section, we
will present new pieces of information that will help us to understand and justify this
result. In the other hand, DSA is the algorithm with worst performance, although DSA
is usually presented as fast signature and verification times as seen in documented in
literature [11, 71]. RSA using Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS) padding (i.e, RSA-
PSS) [58] also presents a bad performance, but less than DSA. The reason behind the high
latency values for both DSA and RSA-PSS is that our solution needs to access the resource
file which represents a key store to execute digital signatures with these algorithms. To
accurately understand how much time the read file operation takes, we measured this
68
5.4. EVALUATION OF BLUETOOTHKSP DIGITAL SIGNATURES
operation time individually and we found that the application can take on average of
1.9 seconds to access the resource files containing the certificates. If we decrement this
resource overhead in the average latency of DSA and RSA-PSS, we can preview that these
algorithms will have a performance only a bit worst than RSA and ECDSA.
Figure 5.7: Comparison of Different Constructions for Digital Signatures.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the distribution of latency values through a Boxplot for these
digital signature algorithms. The distribution enables us to see more clearly that DSA and
RSA-PSS have the worst performance since the maximum, minimum and median values
are always higher than for the other algorithms, more precisely, achieving signatures with
5 seconds of latency. These algorithms can execute signatures with 1 to 2 seconds of
latency and in extreme cases less than 3 seconds. RSA and ECC based signature have the
lowest value dispersion and the lowest median values, where RSA has the lowest median
value but the highest dispersion.
Despite these results for signature schemes, it is important to notice that the evalua-
tion of the number of operations and data transmissions involved in a security protocol
is required to conclude which is the best algorithm to use on each particular case. Our
mobile-computer environment has an use case, where the user receives signature requests
non-sequentially but with a variable time-interval (i.e, opposite to the Signature Bench-
mark), executing one single signature from time to time. The algorithm that produces
this signature must be secure and fast in signature generation and verification. Thus, we
can concluded that ECDSA is the signature algorithm that best fits our requirements and
objectives.
For a final test bench for latency, we compared the performance between our solution
(i.e, BluetoothRemoteKSP) against the Windows-default provider (i.e, Microsoft Soft-
ware Key Storage Provider) and a token (i.e, SafeNet Smart Card KSP ) or smart card (i.e,
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Figure 5.8: Performance Comparison of Constructions of Digital Signatures and Algo-
rithms, using SHA-256.
Gemalto Classic Card CSP) based provider. Our solution is analogous to token and smart
card based provider solutions in the sense that we use the mobile device as the crypto
provider while in the token solution the provider is installed in a USB dongle, and in
the smart card solution the provider is installed in a card chip, but they all are based
in sealed-hardware devices. The main objective of this ultimate test is to show how our
solution can be better or not in terms of average latency than these existing solutions.
The test conditions for this final benchmark include the cryptographic constructions that
demonstrated the best results in the previous benchmark tests, i.e, SHA-256 with ECC
using a P-256 elliptic curve, for our solution. In the case of the remaining solutions, we
used SHA-256 with RSA-2048 for token and smart card based solutions, and we used
SHA-256 with ECC using P-256 elliptic curve for Windows solution. The results from
this experiment are presented in Figure 5.9, where is shown the average latency of each
provider solution per document size using the most secure and performance-efficient
algorithms in each solution.
Our evaluation results follow the expectable trend that wireless communications im-
pose an implicit overhead in latency measurements and is worst than others. In this case,
is the Bluetooth communication channel that produces this overhead (i.e, the Bluetooth
overhead) and delays the whole signature process of our solution, increasing the latency.
As seen from the previous benchmarks, the Blueetooth RTT has always values between
0.2 and 0.3 seconds, therefore, this is the implicit overhead that Bluetooth imposes in
our solution. However, it performs better than the smart card solution due to the fact
that smart cards are slow chips and are the only solution that needs a card reader, which
imposes a significant overhead. Analysing the results, we can conclude that the Bluetooth
overhead makes our solution, in worst case, 1 second slower than token and Windows
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solutions for any document size, which is not a real problem since this delay is mean-
ingless to the final user. Furthermore, the ace of our solution is to provide flexibility,
user-experience and on top of this, security as a priority.
Figure 5.9: Evaluations with Different Cryptographic Providers.
5.4.2 Components in the Observed Latency
Now, we present the components in the observed latency for each one of the signature
benchmarks as a complementary information to help understand the previous results and
observations. This way, we divided the total latency in time intervals (or time chunks), so
that we know which step takes longer time to execute and delays the signature process,
increasing the total latency.
Following the same ordering of the previous sub-section, we start with the secure
hash functions. In this case, we partitioned the latency of the secure hash functions to
understand how much time their computation takes and which percentage of the total
latency it corresponds. Table 5.3 presents the average time duration of each component
in the total latency, where we can see this increase proportional to the hash function. For
Secure Hash Functions, the components are the hash time, the Key Storage Provider (KSP)
pre-operations time and the Bluetooth RTT.
It is normal to think that the time will not increase to much since the only thing that
is transported through the Bluetooth channel is the hash of the document and not the
document itself. And, independently of the document size, the hash will always have the
same size if using the same hash function and as consequence the total latency should be
stable and not increasing with the document size. However, this depends on the compu-
tation of the hash, that takes longer for bigger documents and, consequently, increases
the total latency of the signature. Our results suggests that SHA-384 and SHA-512 are
4-times slower than SHA-256. Bluetooth RTT continues to be similar, only increasing
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with SHA-384 and SHA-512 due to the larger document hashes. KSP pre-operations time
is low and constant for all the secure hash functions.
Table 5.3: Average Latency for RSA Digital Signatures using Different Secure Hash Func-
tions
Total latency (s)
Hash function Hash KSP pre-Ops Bluetooth RTT
SHA256withRSA 0.549 0.229 0.312
SHA384withRSA 2.042 0.227 0.610
SHA521withRSA 2.025 0.232 0.634
Secondly, we present the components in the latency of RSA and ECDSA using different
key sizes. In this case, the total latency was partitioned in order to obtain the signature
and verification times for each algorithm. These components can be observed in the fol-
lowing Table 5.4. We also present the KSP pre-operations and Bluetooth RTT components
to observe how these components change by varying the public-key algorithm and key
sizes used.
Observing the results we can see clearly that ECDSA has always better signature time
than RSA for all key sizes and the verification time tends to be similar to RSA with lower
key sizes, but slightly higher with larger key sizes. However, ECDSA has very large KSP
pre-operations times rather than RSA, where it can be 3-times slower than RSA. These
KSP operations before the signature process delay the ECDSA signature generation in
such way that RSA can perform better than ECDSA in terms of overall latency. Although,
the results presented enhance the efficiency improvement of ECC over RSA for the same
level of security regarding signature generation and verification times. The Bluetooth
RTT continues to be constant once again.
Thirdly, we present the components in the latency of different signature schemes.
Now, we partitioned the total latency in the same way as the previous experiment, but
with the intent of observing the KSP pre-operations, signature and verification times for
different signature schemes. These components in the latency observed are presented in
the following Table 5.5.
As we can see, and as expected, the signature time of RSA is much higher than sig-
nature time of ECC. However, the KSP pre-operations invoked for ECDSA take much
more time to execute than for RSA with a much higher difference than in signature time.
Therefore, RSA has better performance than ECDSA for each document size. In the other
hand, DSA has fast signature and verification times, although has worst performance
due to the access to the resource file and has an high KSP pre-operations time such as
ECDSA. RSA-PSS has the same problem of accessing a resource file, but has low KSP
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Table 5.4: Average Latency for RSA and ECC Digital Signatures using Different Key Sizes
Total latency (s)
Signature Algorithm KSP pre-Ops Bluetooth RTT Sign Verify
SHA256withRSA (1024 keys) 0.224 0.304 0.044 0.001
SHA256withRSA (3072 keys) 0.231 0.321 0.109 0.002
SHA256withRSA (4096 keys) 0.230 0.332 0.166 0.002
SHA256withECDSA (256 keys) 0.595 0.324 0.036 0.002
SHA256withECDSA (384 keys) 0.604 0.333 0.055 0.003
SHA256withECDSA (521 keys) 0.656 0.309 0.067 0.006
pre-operations time such as RSA-PKCS#1.
Table 5.5: Average Latency with Different Digital Signatures Schemes.
Total latency (s)
Signature Algorithm KSP pre-Ops Bluetooth Sign Verify
SHA256witDSA (1024 keys) 0.753 0.332 0.001 0.002
SHA256withRSA (3072 keys) 0.231 0.321 0.109 0.002
SHA256withRSA/PSS (2048 keys) 0.293 0.359 0.0047 0.0015
SHA256withECDSA (256 keys) 0.595 0.324 0.036 0.002
5.5 Bluetooth Performance Evaluation
In this section, it is compared the impact of using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technol-
ogy and security enforcements, such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), for executing
certificate and digital signatures requests.
5.5.1 Bluetooth Low Energy
Regarding BLE, the goal of this experiment is to understand how this technology could
improve or impact our solution. It was performed a test benchmark with different digital
signature algorithms (equally to third benchmark in Section 5.4) to compare the overall
latency of the execution of digital signatures with BLE. This benchmark was conducted
through the Signature Benchmark client with the same configuration described before,
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varying only the signing certificate with the security equivalent key sizes.
BLE is the second implementation or protocol of Bluetooth technology mainly de-
signed and modelled to accommodate Internet of Things (IoT) applications and low-
battery devices. With this goal in mind, the BLE packet length (more precisely, the
maximum length of the data to be transmitted) is smaller than the packet length used
in Bluetooth Classic. The default and maximum length for the first one is 512 bytes and
for the second is 1021 bytes [19]. Notice that, in the case of BLE, this maximum length
are negotiated between the two Bluetooth devices moments before a connection and data
exchange take place, so the data maximum length is dependent from what both devices
support individually. Bluetooth Classic handles packet length in a different way, because
the communication is based in streams and we can specify the maximum length through
the API. With our test environment, the mobile phone and computer negotiate a maxi-
mum length of 516 bytes for BLE and we specified a maximum length of 1024 bytes for
Bluetooth Classic in the prototype implementation. It is also important to notice that, if
packets have a length higher than the maximum length, they are partitioned in chunks
with the maximum length allowed and are transmitted sequentially.
Regarding the specification protocol, BLE technology uses different protocols com-
pared with Bluetooth Classic, which are focused in the functionality and features of the
IoT devices. The most important one is called GATT/ATT, which is, in fact a combination
of two protocols that consist of providing attributes through a service hosted in a LE de-
vice, from which client LE devices can read current values or write new ones. Therefore,
only attribute values are transmitted through Bluetooth, confirming the reduction of the
packet size and a less power consumption for devices.
In fact, this BLE specification protocol does not correspond to our requirements and
goals, because our solution implies transmitting data over Bluetooth with lengths higher
than the maximum packet length of BLE. For example, in the case of certificate requests,
the data exchanged between our prototype applications are JSON strings that can achieve
lengths higher than 2000 bytes, depending on the number of certificates retrieved. An-
other reason is that using JSON constructions to transmit multiple informations (as in our
solution for certificate and signature requests) in one time is against the goal of the ATT
protocol which is to send one attribute value each time when a LE client device interacts
with a LE server device.
Yet, we successfully employed the BLE technology in our solution and completed dig-
ital signature processes with success. An experiment with certificates requests was not
done, because of the huge exponential packet length when retrieving certificates existing
in the mobile phone, which rounds 4154 bytes for only 5 certificates (even represented
as base 64 strings). This packet length exceeds to much the maximum packet length in
a way that dividing it by chunks would imply only a significant delay in the latency. Is
also important to notice that was only possible to perform digital signatures which length
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combined, with other pieces of information (such as the timestamps from Android side)
required to transmit in the JSON packet, were less than the maximum packet length (516
bits). For example, RSA-2048 produces 256-bit length signatures, ECDSA-256 produces
70 to 72 bit length signatures and DSA-1024 produces 40-bit length signatures. This
signature length combined with the remaining status and timestamps information length
cannot surpass the maximum packet length. Support for key lengths which produce sig-
nature lengths that cause the JSON packet length to be higher than the maximum packet
length was not completed or finished due to some implementation issues on our prototype
in the moment when ATT protocol generates the chunks of the data to be transmitted,
although the protocol handles the packets fragmentation as stated in documentation.
Plus, the Signature Benchmark performed to measured the performance was done
only with 10 benchmark runs for each document size, because the time to perform a
single signature using BLE is to high. The Bluetooth sockets get stucked in disconnected
mode for a long time delaying the whole signature process. Figure 5.10 shows the results
obtained from this BLE experiment.
Figure 5.10: Average latency of Remote Digital Signatures using BLE.
The results suggest that the usage of BLE with our solution may lead to bad perfor-
mance independently of the signature algorithm used, except for ECDSA, which main-
tains its performance throughout the size of the documents due to the low signature
lengths produced. Although JSON constructions tend to be small and less than the maxi-
mum packet length, the LE specification protocol based in advertisements and in the ATT
protocol imposes a significantly delay in the latency when executing digital signatures.
One of the main causes of these high latency values is because LE protocol has a default
time of 30 seconds to search for advertisements, but it is also possible to re-define a spe-
cific time. Since the default time is to elevated, we defined a specific discoverability time
of 2 seconds in order to have time to discover our target device and Bluetooth service with-
out increasing the latency to much in the process. This means that besides the Bluetooth
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overhead we will also have another implicit overhead due to the Bluetooth discoverabil-
ity time. Another reason for these results its because of the inefficient implementation
of BLE support on our prototype, which has a workaround to successfully perform at-
tribute write requests with responses. This is by default provided by the Windows 10
APIs through a specific function named WriteWithResponse, but without knowing why
the function its not working and due to time restrictions we didn’t investigate completely
the origin of this issue. Therefore, we implemented a workaround that basically consisted
in performing a Write request to demand the execution of a digital signature, and sequen-
tially, a Read request to obtain the digital signature result. However, this involves the
establishment of a connection for each one of the requests, turning the process very heavy
and delaying the whole signature process.
5.5.2 TLS/Bluetooth Enforcement
In relation to the security enforcement, it is compared the performance results of the se-
curity enforcement implementation, more precisely, the TLS channel over the Bluetooth
communication channel. The goal of this evaluation is to know the overhead caused by
the security extra-layer on the process of digital signatures. Due to implementation and
time limitations, it was only performed a test benchmark for the certificate requests and
using only a default cipher suite for the TLS channel (i.e TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH
_AES_256_GCM_SHA384). This test was conducted using the Setup Benchmark client
with the same configuration explained in Section 5.2. The results of this experiment are
represented in Figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Latency measures using TLS Layering Enforcement.
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Comparing with the results presented in Section 5.2, using an extra-layer of security
as the TLS channel slightly increases the overall latency by 1.5 to 2 seconds in average
for each different number of certificates. The results also show that latency continues
to be proportional with the number of certificates, for example, responses containing
10 certificates have an higher dispersion of values and median than responses with less
certificates and it will increase further if the number of certificates doubles or triples.
Notice that, the main objective of this security enforcement is to conceal a secure and
protected communication channel for Bluetooth-enabled devices with lower and insecure
versions of Bluetooth that have privacy and protection demands regarding the data ex-
changed. Our results show that a security enforcement as the TLS implies an acceptable
overhead in the Bluetooth communications and enhances the security provided by the
solution. Although, in current Bluetooth versions (v4.0 to v5.0), the security and protec-
tion levels provided by Bluetooth security mechanisms are already considered very high,
leading to security enforcement layers being considered as unnecessary overhead.
5.6 Other BluetoothKSP Evaluation Metrics
In this section, it is presented additional evaluation metrics such as prototype packaging,
memory usage, and energy consumption, which help to enhance the validation of our
mobile cryptographic provider.
5.6.1 Packaging Metrics
In relation to the packaging of our mobile crypto provider to be further distributed to
computer users, we need to package each prototype component and its dependencies
in its own package. For example, the WindowsCertificateManager was packaged as a
executable file which can be executed in the user Windows computer to install or run the
.NET application; the BluetoothKSP was also packaged as an executable file that executes
an installer to register our Key Storage Provider (KSP) in a particular Windows computer;
and CertificateManager was converted to an APK file (i.e, the file extension that represents
an Android application) to be further installed in a particular smartphone.
These packagings are generally easy to be generate, except in the case of BluetoothKSP,
where a complete installer, that executes all the KSP register operations, must be cre-
ated. In the case of the Android application, the APK file is automatically generated by
the package manager Gradle when building the application. The APK file of the Cer-
tificateManager application has a total size of 2,5 MB. The Windows .NET applications
also generates the executable file automatically when building the application. The ex-
ecutable or packaging file of WindowsCertificateManager has a total size of 81 KB. For
BluetoothKSP, the process to generate an executable setup file that will install the C++
library on other computers is a bit more difficulty since we need to create a new setup
project (besides our BluetoothKSP project) to accomplish the BluetoothKSP deployment.
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However, From the user perspective, any of these packagings distribution can be seen
as a lightweight process since all the components are not very big, except the DLL library.
5.6.2 Memory Resources and Utilization
In this section, we show other experimental observation on the mobile environment, in
this case, the volatile memory (or RAM) used by the CertiticateManager when computing
signatures or running the Bluetooth service. The objective of this experiment is to evaluate
the memory usage of different digital signature schemes with our solution and which
is the impact compared with the normal execution of the application, i.e, running the
Bluetooth service. Similarly to the previous benchmark, we are also concerned with the
memory used by our solution to complete signature processes in mobile devices due to
their small volatile storage space. As such, we conducted a memory benchmark evaluation
to measure the real memory cost of executing signature generation in mobile devices with
our CertiticateManager.
This memory benchmark consisted in executing the Signature Benchmark client with
the same test conditions described in the previous section. For measuring the Certit-
icateManager memory usage we used the available “Running Services” tool under the
“Developer Options” in the smartphone settings. Notice that, this experiment discards
the data stored on disk or by the Android Keystore in the SE - such as the private key.
Before measuring the memory usage, we measured first the memory cost when start-
ing the CertificateManager application and without receiving any signature requests (just
listening the Bluetooth Socket ). The average used memory obtained is 41 MB, which
corresponds to 0.010% of the total volatile memory (4GB).
Table 5.6: Average Memory Usage of the Supported Digital Signatures with Different
Security Levels.
Memory Usage (MB)
Signature Algorithm 128 bits 192 bits 256 bits
SHA256withRSA 45 - -
SHA256withDSA 49 - -
SHA256withECDSA 44 45 45
Table 5.6 presents results obtained of the memory usage of the supported digital
signature schemes. Note that, the values not appearing in the table are due to the fact
that the respective algorithm key size is not supported by the Android OS. As the results
suggest, when the signature operations start to be executed in sequence, the average
memory used slightly increases independently of the signature algorithm. Our results
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are very coherent with results from other studies [6, 71] in the sense that ECDSA requires
less storage space than RSA and DSA in both ways: key length and signature length. As
seen before, this is because, ECDSA has small keys and computes the signature faster,
which leads to less memory usage. The only difference is that ECDSA with larger keys
has equal memory usage as RSA.
With this results, we can conclude that our mobile crypto provider solution uses on
average 0,011% of the total memory available to generate a signature, which does not
seem to be a big deal comparing with other Android applications even if it is running as
a service in the background listening the Bluetooth Sockets.
5.6.3 Power Consumption Observation
In this section, we present the experimental observations done on the mobile environment
in relation to the energy consumed by the CertificateManager when executing signature
operations and listening for connection requests through the Bluetooth service. The goal
of this experiment is to evaluate the power consumption of different digital signature
schemes with our solution and which is the impact compared to the smartphone common
usage - such as interacting with and navigating through Android applications. This
concern is extremely important due to the limited energy resources that wireless devices
have (for example, the mobile phone battery) which restricts their power use. Although, in
current days, wireless communication technology provides protocols and resources that
lead to low-power and inexpensive Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) [71, 80]. Also,
there are standard digital signatures considered as efficient and assumed as less power
consuming for these environments such as ECDSA [6, 71]. Thus, the energy impact of the
signature operation in the mobile phones is expected to be low.
5.6.3.1 Power Consumption of BluetoothKSP Digital Signatures
Then, we conducted an energy benchmark evaluation to know the real cost of executing
digital signatures in mobile devices by our CertificateManager. This energy benchmark
consisted in executing the Signature Benchmark client with 20 runs of signature requests
per document size to generate the average consumption for each digital signature algo-
rithm using SHA-256 and different key sizes corresponding to the security levels: 128,
192, and 256 bits. For measuring the mobile phone energy consumption we used a third-
party mobile application called AccuBattery 3, which calculates the energy consumption
of the mobile device and the individual consumption of each Android application in
milliampere (mA) units. The mobile phone used for the benchmark is equipped with a
Li-ion battery [66] that has a maximum capacity of 3000 mA per hour.
Before we analyze the impact of the supported digital signature schemes, let us first
highlight the measured power consumption when not having any user application run-
ning in first or second plan (i.e, in idle mode); and for a common pattern of use. The
3https://www.accubatteryapp.com/
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average measurements obtained are 139,7 mA and 362,2 mA, respectively. Additionally,
we measured only the power consumption of the CertificateManager application listening
for Bluetooth connection requests, which achieves a consumption of 150,9 mA. Note that,
all these metrics were measured in time intervals of 5 minutes.
Table 5.7: Average Power Consumption of the Supported Digital Signatures with Different
Security Levels.
Power Consumption (mA)
Signature Algorithm 128 bits 192 bits 256 bits
SHA256withRSA 209,5 - -
SHA256withDSA 310,5 - -
SHA256withECDSA 182,2 182,7 184
Table 5.7 shows the power consumption of the supported digital signature schemes.
Considering the initial energy costs measured, we can conclude in general that the impact
of our solution is small and that it can perform better than other applications. This is
due to the fact that our CertiticateManager is an Android application that only listens the
smartphone Bluetooth socket for packets directed to the Bluetooth service that it runs;
executes a cryptographic operation or not when a request is received; and sends back a
response packet through the socket.
Considering that the signature benchmark was executed 20 times for each one of
the five sample documents, we can say that the average value presented in Table 5.7 is
the average of 100 digital signatures over documents with variable length. In the case
of RSA, we have an average of 209,5 mA per signature. Also, to drain completely the
smartphone battery it will be necessary the execution of more than 10.0000 RSA-based
digital signatures.
5.6.3.2 Comparative Analysis
Energy costs of signature generation depends mostly on the security level (i.e, key size)
and the operation execution time, therefore, the energy consumption is proportional to
these two variables. Our results show that RSA and DSA signatures are energetically
more expensive due to the high computation cost of the private key operation, being DSA
the less energy efficient; and ECDSA is the most energy efficient signature algorithm for
all security levels. These results are consistent with previous literature experiments such
as presented in [71].
Thus, we can conclude that our mobile crypto provider solution can impact the energy
consumption on average by 30.42% regarding the idle state energy consumption, but
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consumes much less than other applications running as they can impact the consumption
by 159.27%.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter we presented and discussed our experimental results over the imple-
mented prototype, in six different types of evaluation benchmarks. These experiments
were conducted on both the BluetoothKSP (computer) and CertificateManager (mobile
phone) components of the prototype and two testing benchmarks were implemented to
execute them. A detailed analysis was performed for each benchmark section, which is
briefly summarized next:
• The configuration or setup phase, i.e, the certificates request issued to the Blue-
toothRemoteKSP tends to produce a reasonable average latency for a variable num-
ber of certificates taking into account the human time perception, although is nec-
essary to execute this configuration for each new computer where is further desired
to perform remote digital signatures.
• The hash function SHA-256 has an efficient performance for all document sizes
while SHA-384 and SHA-512 perform worse and worse as the document grows
larger. RSA has a bad performance proportional to the key length and documents
size, i.e, it performs worse as the key length increases and the document grows
larger. The most secure (i.e, 128-bit security level) and efficient key length is 3072.
In the other hand, ECDSA has similar performance with any key length for a specific
document size, being ECDSA-521 a few times the fastest one. For the same security
level as RSA, the most efficient ECDSA key length is 256.
• The signature average latency of our solution tends to be better when using RSA-
3072 algorithm with the hash function SHA-256 for all documents size. ECDSA is
the second with the best performance and with a low margin regarding RSA. RSA-
PSS and DSA are the signature algorithms with worst performances due to the need
of accessing the resource key stores, which increases latency to much. However,
ECDSA is the algorithm with the best performance at 128-bit security level and that
best fits our requirements and goals simultaneously.
• The ECC-based signatures normally perform better than RSA and also provides
an equal security level with smaller keys, offering faster computations, less stor-
age space and less demands on bandwidth, and is ideal for constrained environ-
ments such as our mobile phone. RSA has excellent signature verification times and
ECDSA has great signature generation times. One of the few weaknesses of ECDSA
is only the verification time.
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• The performance of our solution is clearly worst than a Windows default provider
or a a Token-based provider, but only with a difference of 1 second for each different
document size. On the other hand, our solution offers flexibility and transparency
to the final user and protection and security for their data, which helps disguise this
performance flaw.
• The security enforcement, more precisely, the TLS can bring an maximum latency
overhead of 2 seconds independently of the data size (for example, the number of
certificates retrieved), which do not seems to be a great disadvantage regarding the
security and protection that is obtained as trade-off.
• Given the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) specification protocol and our objectives -
such as retrieving a variable list of certificates from the mobile phone and requesting
signature operations - this technology is not worth for our use case and environment,
since to take full advantage of BLE we needed to compromise the security of the
solution by reducing the key sizes in order to achieve the required packet length
and change our protocols in order to adapt them to the ATT protocol. Also, this
data exchange can take longer than if it was done with Bluetooth Classic if the data
size to be retrieved is very high. Thus, the use of BLE with our solution worsens the
performance and delays the certificates retrieving and signature generation.
• The prototype software components (and their packaging) are not very heavy, al-
though the final user will need to install two applications in different devices and
one cryptographic provider.
• The CertificateManager application in the mobile environment has less power con-
sumption than other Android applications and only has a small increase during
signature processes compared with the consumption in idle mode. ECDSA and
DSA are the digital signature algorithms with less and most energy consumption,
respectively. The ECDSA consumption stays constant when varying the security
bits.
• Regarding memory usage, our mobile application uses less memory comparing
with other applications when is listening for certificate or signature requests via
Bluetooth or even when its executing signatures generation. The difference between
listening for requests and computing signatures corresponds to only 8MB in the
worst case. ECDSA uses less memory such as RSA while DSA is the signature
algorithm that more memory uses.
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Conclusions
In this chapter we present the main findings in the conclusion of the dissertation, regard-
ing the investigation conducted, our system model assumptions and the instantiation in
its prototype implementation. From these conclusions we discuss open issues and limita-
tions, as well as, opportunities for future work directions in enhancements, optimizations
and refinements.
6.1 Main Conclusions and Remarks
In this dissertation we addressed the design, prototyping and experimental evaluation
of a mobile cryptographic provider for Android smartphones, used to manage, store and
execute digital signatures for external devices, namely Microsoft Windows desktops. The
proposed solution, although oriented towards support and testing in particular techno-
logical environments, followed the approach of a generic model that can later be gener-
alized to other computing environments and other supporting technologies. Included in
the dissertation objectives, we addressed the security guarantees provided for integrity,
authentication and authorization properties, in accessing the functions offered by the
Android-enabled mobile cryptographic provider.
In the Related work we survey the characteristics, properties, threats and protection
related with the state-of-the-art solutions in approaching wireless communication chan-
nel and private keys management and storage security. The study oriented the choice of
Bluetooth and smartphone’s Secure Element (SE) to leverage the objectives of the disser-
tation. We studied the APIs and architecture of cryptographic providers of the chosen
platform (i.e, Windows) to be considered as the base for our proposal, considering the
most recent and secure Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG), although not yet fully
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implemented by some technologies. During the dissertation work, we also studied tech-
nical solutions, such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) and Transport Layer Security (TLS),
that increase the security of Bluetooth connections to support secure communication
channels and involved cryptographic operations, between Windows-based applications
and the smartphone mobile cryptographic provider, with insecure Bluetooth versions.
From the studied Related Work, we proposed a System Model and Architecture for
the remote mobile cryptographic provider. As a corollary, we designed the cryptographic
provider services that enable storage and management functions for X509v3 certificates
and cryptographic keys, providing these services to Windows-based applications, in a
transparent way. For Windows-based applications, the solution is regarded as a Windows-
based local-installed crypto provider.
We provided an implementation of the proposed solution. The implementation was
addressed as a ready prototype that is usable as a pre-product in a funded initiative and
partnership between the FCT/UNL and NOVA-LINCS Research Center and Multicert
S.A. Using the provided prototype we conducted an experimental evaluation, following
different assessment criteria, to validate the designed solution, targeting the following
observations: (1) validity testing on the transparency of the proposed solutions regarded
by Windows-based applications; (2) performance evaluation of digital signatures pro-
vided by the designed Android mobile cryptographic provider, observing latency and
operations’ throughputs; (3) Performance analysis of the provided Bluetooth-enabled
communication channel and impact of their security mechanisms, and (4) additional
experimental analysis on the implemented mobile cryptographic provider solution to ob-
serve packaging metrics, runtime instrumentation and use of resources; as well as, power
consumption evaluation.
Overall, the dissertation achieved the defined objectives, as well as the specific contri-
butions beyond the planned goals. We addressed the problems and limitations of using
a smartphone as a cryptographic provider and Bluetooth as the wireless environment
to transmit sensitive data and created a model and proof-of-work of that same model.
The implemented prototype is capable of providing itself as a cost-effective and flexible
alternative to traditional USB tokens or dongles and smart cards, handling independent
end-user scrutiny and better control of their data, with the additional security enforce-
ments together with Bluetooth security mechanisms, thereby preventing tampering and
corruption by a malicious entity.
6.2 Future Work
We were able to implement a functional prototype of our system model, although there
are some features that were not totally implemented according to relevant theoretical
design assumptions, and some related issues were left opened, which could be improved
upon in the future. Besides the effort in a more extensive evaluation and benchmarking
84
6.2. FUTURE WORK
using different and heterogeneous devices from different origins or manufacturers, we
emphasize the following future work initiatives:
• Overlaying enforcement of TLS/Bluetooth communication. Related to our Blue-
toothKSP component, it was left to implement the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
support that would allow in enhancing the security of the communication channel
between the Certificate Manager and the BluetoothKSP components, while exe-
cuting digital signatures. This can be integrated in the short term, as relevant
extended overlaying security enforcement, particularly in the circumvention of
possible fragilities of certain Bluetooth implementations or solutions based in old-
versions. The implementation task for this feature started a bit late than initially
expected and we found some technical issues in the chosen library (Botan1). For
example, the integration of this library in the mobile crypto provider solution was
causing runtime conflicts within software components causing crashes when a sig-
nature requests is performed. A future solution for the implementation problems
would increase the reliability and consistency of the results obtained for the impact
of TLS on our solution (more precisely, on the signature process). Furthermore, we
can address in the future new Signature Benchmark evaluations with TLS, enrich-
ing the completeness and validation of the current prototype. As a direction the
detected problems we must investigate the origin of the conflict or to take a new
decision for a new open source C++ library for TLS to fulfill our requirements and
allowing to us to manipulate TLS/Bluetooth data streams;
• Refinement of standardization formats for Digital Signatures. Regarding the im-
plementation of the Signature Benchmark client, our solution invokes on-demand
requested digital signatures creating on-the-fly hashes for the sample documents.
Our formats are not using the formal standard digital signature formats and pro-
cedures, such as those formats formalized for the Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
construction [61]. Due to the lack of support from .NET documentation and specific
runtime support to provide a consistent API for DSS, as the formal standard ad-
dresses, we were unable to implement the related formalization that could help us
better understanding the latency values obtained from the signature benchmarks
and the investigation of impact factors. Also, this feature would help to elevate
the Signature Benchmark resemblance to any real-world application, which expects
to use the DSS standard. Anyway, for the initial purposes the refinement was not
considered as priority, because what really mattered in the latency and related
throughput observations was the signature processing time (with the dominant ex-
ponentiation time of the DSS signature) and the Bluetooth Round-Trip-Time (RTT),
and not the format processing of final signature objects. A suggestion to address this
as future work could be the reimplementation of the Signature Benchmark Client
1https://botan.randombit.net/
85
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
using the Java programming language, where exists reasonable documentation and
various open-source code samples for creating digital signatures using the DSS con-
struction. Unfortunately, Java (more precisely, the SunMSCAPI provider) does not
yet have full support for Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) and a future
Signature Benchmark in Java would not be able to execute signature requests 2.
• Remote attestation facilities. One security feature that was not addressed timely
in the dissertation was the Remote Attestation protocol, which would consist in
validating the Bluetooth crypto provider source code installed and loaded in the
Windows OS library and attesting the remote mobile crypto-provider. The main
objective of this protocol is to mitigate attacks against the execution after the possi-
ble injection of tampered data to the user mobile phone in order to obtain a valid
signature, recognizing that the attestation proofs are not correct, stopping malicious
KSPs from requesting forged signatures by the tampered remote crypto-provider
components. This protocol is relevant as a security enforcement of our present solu-
tion and could enhance the protection of the implemented mobile crypto provider.
In this future direction a possible initial approach could consist in modeling the Re-
mote Attestation protocol, validating its specification and integration in the current
solution, and finally conclude the related implementation.
• Bluetooth-enabled pairing enforcements. Our implementation components de-
pend on the secure establishment of a Bluetooth connection. As stated before,
except the Pairing method, all other Bluetooth security mechanisms are usually
defined automatically, during the initial negotiation of devices configurations and
cannot be changed programmatically. These security mechanisms - such as the pair-
ing algorithm, the authentication algorithm and the encryption algorithm - are all
negotiated depending on the Bluetooth versions of the devices. During the Pairing
first-phase, both devices exchange pairing information (for example, capacities and
requirements, as specified in the Bluetooth device configuration). This done via
pairing request and response packets. In each device configuration, the Bluetooth
protocol computes the final security parametrizations for further key generation,
key establishment and connection processes. In the Pairing-first-phase, it is possi-
ble to intercept pairing packets through the Bluetooth service and force the pairing
configuration desired for further connections. The initial idea to deal with the pos-
sible programmatic enforcement of parametrizations was considered, bit were not
finished due to time restrictions. A task in the future work direction would be the
investigation and validation of Pairing methods that can be actually proposed and
the supported ones in different versions of Bluetooth implementations, to create
a smart and secure dynamic negotiation handshake, addressing security default
2https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8026953?subTaskView=unresolved
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settings and establishing the acceptable or the enforced levels of security, whenever
possible and supported.
• Refinements in transparent use of DSA signatures for Microsoft Word and Out-
look applications. Due to time restrictions, we were not able to implement com-
pletely the KSPEnumAlgorithms and KSPExportKey functions which are required
for the digital signature processes of Microsoft Word and Outlook applications (as
well as other Microsoft Office Applications). Unlike Adobe Reader. This leaves our
mobile crypto provider a little bit limited in the transparency support, an issue that
will be more relevant in offering the solution as a future product in the Multicert S.A
portfolio. Even that this is more a concern for a final product perspective, it makes
sense to address a future work task in finalizing the implementation of those two
Key Storage Provider (KSP) functions, and finally validate the full-fledged trans-
parency support by performing digital signatures with ECDSA and DSA algorithms
requested by Microsoft Office applications.
• New digital signature schemes. There is also space for future research on the im-
provement of the signature schemes supported by our solution. For example, it
is interesting to further investigate and employ the support for signature schemes
based on the elliptic curve named Curve25519 [16], which is an elliptic curve de-
signed for use with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme,
but is also used in a Edwards-coordinate signature system named Ed25519 [44].
This is an elliptic curve that has gaining considerable interest in recent years. This
support was added to OpenSSL v1.1 2 and also announced as part of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-186 3 and
considered as the use of secure and efficient elliptic curves in the state-of-the-art,
being an alternative to the used efficient P-256 elliptic curve. Actually, we began
implementation and validation work to integrate this elliptic curve in our solution,
but this is a on-going task that require a future work stream.
• Other refinements and optimizations. Also related with Bluetooth, but in this
case with BLE technology, we successfully implemented the BLE support on our
prototype and performed digital signatures with the supported algorithms via a
BLE-based secure channel. Although, the current implementation has some flaws
and issues that were left to investigate in more detail. More precisely we addressed
initially a workaround to deal with Read/Write requests, to deal with the generation
and establishment of two connections and the problem of JSON packet lengths that
exceeds the BLE maximum packet length specification. A direction for future work
would be to continue the investigation of the root cause of these issues and to correct
and refine them in a new prototype, with expected performance gains.
87

Bibliography
[1] 256-bit Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) - secp256r1 (alias NIST P-256 Algorithm)),
OID 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7. Global OID Reference Database, International Organiza-
tion for Standardization (ISO). url: http://oid-info.com/get/1.2.840.10045.
3.1.7 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[2] Adobe. Securing PDFs with certificates. 2019. url: https://helpx.adobe.com/uk/
acrobat/using/securing-pdfs-certificates.html (visited on 08/17/2019).
[3] N. Akinyokun and V. Teague. “Security and Privacy Implications of NFC-enabled
Contactless Payment Systems.” In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Availability, Reliability and Security. ARES ’17. Reggio Calabria, Italy: ACM,
2017, 47:1–47:10. isbn: 978-1-4503-5257-4. doi: 10.1145/3098954.3103161.
url: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3098954.3103161 (visited on 09/20/2019).
[4] H. A. Al-Ofeishat and M. A. Al Rababah. “Near field communication (NFC).” In:
International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security (IJCSNS) 12.2 (2012),
p. 93.
[5] M. Al-Zarouni. “The reality of risks from consented use of USB devices.” In: (2006).
url: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://
scholar.google.pt/&httpsredir=1&article=1061&context=ism (visited on
01/16/2019).
[6] M. Al-Zubaidie, Z. Zhang, and J. Zhang. “Efficient and Secure ECDSA Algorithm
and its Applications: A Survey.” In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.10313 (2019).
[7] M. A. Albahar, O. Olawumi, K. Haataja, and P. Toivanen. “A Novel Method for
Bluetooth Pairing using Steganography.” In: International Journal on Information
Technologies & Security 9.1 (2017), pp. 53–66.
[8] M Alimohammadi and A. Pouyan. “Performance analysis of cryptography methods
for secure message exchanging in VANET.” In: International Journal of Scientific &
Engineering Research 5.2 (2014), p. 912.
[9] S. C. Alliance. “Host card emulation (hce) 101.” In: A Smart Card Alliance Mobile
and NFC Council White Paper (2014).
89
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[10] F. Aloul, S. Zahidi, and W. El-Hajj. “Two factor authentication using mobile phones.”
In: Computer Systems and Applications, 2009. AICCSA 2009. IEEE/ACS International
Conference on. IEEE. 2009, pp. 641–644.
[11] P. Anantharaman, K. Palani, D. Nicol, and S. W. Smith. “I Am Joe’s Fridge: Scal-
able Identity in the Internet of Things.” In: 2016 IEEE International Conference on
Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (Green-
Com) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data
(SmartData). IEEE. 2016, pp. 129–135.
[12] ANSI X9.62 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures and mod-
ules, OID 1.2.840.10045.4. Global OID Reference Database, International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO). url: http://oid-info.com/get/1.2.840.
10045.4 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[13] R. Bardou, R. Focardi, Y. Kawamoto, L. Simionato, G. Steel, and J.-K. Tsay. “Efficient
padding oracle attacks on cryptographic hardware.” In: Advances in Cryptology–
CRYPTO 2012. Springer, 2012, pp. 608–625.
[14] E. Barker. “SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key Management, Part
1: General.” In: NIST special publication 800 (2016), p. 57. doi: 10.6028/NIST.SP.
800-57pt1r4.
[15] C. Bermejo and P. Hui. “Steal Your Life Using 5 Cents: Hacking Android Smart-
phones with NFC Tags.” In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.02081 (2017).
[16] D. J. Bernstein. “Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records.” In: International
Workshop on Public Key Cryptography. Springer. 2006, pp. 207–228.
[17] A. S. Bhala, V. P. Kshirsagar, M. B. Nagori, and M. K. Deshmukh. “Performance
comparison of elliptical curve and rsa digital signature on arm7.” In: Proceedings
of International Conference on Information and Network Technology (IPCSIT), Singa-
pore.(4),(2011). 2011, pp. 58–62.
[18] M. Blaser. Securing ad hoc embedded wireless networks with public-key cryptography.
2006. url: https://www.edn.com/design/other/4025638/Securing-ad-hoc-
embedded- wireless- networks- with- public- key- cryptography (visited on
08/17/2019).
[19] Bluetooth Core Specification - v5.0. Tech. rep. Bluetooth Special Interest Group, 2016.
url: https://www.mouser.it/pdfdocs/bluetooth-Core-v50.pdf (visited on
02/02/2019).
[20] Bluetooth SIG. Bluetooth Market Update Report. 2019.
[21] F. F. Brasser, S. Bugiel, A. Filyanov, A.-R. Sadeghi, and S. Schulz. “Softer Smart-
cards.” In: International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Springer. 2012, pp. 329–343.
90
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[22] M. Collotta, G. Pau, T. Talty, and O. K. Tonguz. “Bluetooth 5: A concrete step
forward toward the IoT.” In: IEEE Communications Magazine 56.7 (2018), pp. 125–
131.
[23] L. Constantin. Stop using SHA1 encryption: It’s now completely unsafe, Google proves.
2017. url: https://www.pcworld.com/article/3173791/stop-using-sha1-
it-s-now-completely-unsafe.html (visited on 08/17/2019).
[24] T. Cooijmans, E. E. Poll, E. E. Verheul, and T. T. P. ter Gunne. “Secure key stor-
age and secure computation in Android.” In: Master’s thesis, Radboud University
Nijmegen (2014).
[25] T. Cooijmans, J. de Ruiter, and E. Poll. “Analysis of secure key storage solutions
on android.” In: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on Security and Privacy in
Smartphones & Mobile Devices. ACM. 2014, pp. 11–20.
[26] P. Cope, J. Campbell, and T. Hayajneh. “An investigation of Bluetooth security vul-
nerabilities.” In: Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC),
2017 IEEE 7th Annual. IEEE. 2017, pp. 1–7.
[27] V. Coskun, B. Ozdenizci, and K. Ok. “A survey on near field communication (NFC)
technology.” In: Wireless personal communications 71.3 (2013), pp. 2259–2294.
[28] M. L. Das. “Two-factor user authentication in wireless sensor networks.” In: IEEE
transactions on wireless communications 8.3 (2009), pp. 1086–1090.
[29] A. Developers. Android 4.4 APIs. Tech. rep. 2019. url: https://developer.
android.com/about/versions/android-4.4 (visited on 01/15/2019).
[30] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. “New directions in cryptography.” In: IEEE transactions
on Information Theory 22.6 (1976), pp. 644–654.
[31] Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) subject public key. Global OID Reference Database,
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). url: http://oid-info.
com/get/1.2.840.10040.4.1 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[32] D. M. Eagleman and A. O. Holcombe. “Causality and the perception of time.” In:
Trends in cognitive sciences 6.8 (2002), pp. 323–325.
[33] J.-E. Ekberg, K. Kostiainen, and N Asokan. “Trusted execution environments on
mobile devices.” In: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &
communications security. ACM. 2013, pp. 1497–1498.
[34] Federal Office for Information Security. Protection Profile for the Security Mod-
ule of a Smart Meter Gateway (Security Module PP). Version 1.03. 2014. url:
commoncriteriaportal . org / files / ppfiles / pp0077b _ pdf . pdf (visited on
08/17/2019).
[35] M. Feldhofer and C. Rechberger. “A case against currently used hash functions in
RFID protocols.” In: OTM Confederated International Conferences"On the Move to
Meaningful Internet Systems". Springer. 2006, pp. 372–381.
91
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[36] D. Filizzola, S. Fraser, and N. Samsonau. Security Analysis of Bluetooth Technology.
2018.
[37] N. FORUM. NFC Data Exchange Format (NDEF), Technical Specification, Version 1.0.
Tech. rep. NFC Forum, 2006.
[38] C. Gomez, J. Oller, and J. Paradells. “Overview and evaluation of bluetooth low
energy: An emerging low-power wireless technology.” In: Sensors 12.9 (2012),
pp. 11734–11753.
[39] S. Gurjar, I. Baggili, F. Breitinger, and A. Fischer. “An Empirical Comparison of
Widely Adopted Hash Functions in Digital Forensics: Does the Programming Lan-
guage and Operating System Make a Difference?” In: Proceedings of the Conference
on Digital Forensics, Security and Law. 2015, pp. 57–68. url: https://commons.
erau.edu/adfsl/2015/tuesday/6/.
[40] S. Hameed, U. M. Jamali, and A. Samad. “Protecting NFC data exchange against
eavesdropping with encryption record type definition.” In: Network Operations and
Management Symposium (NOMS), 2016 IEEE/IFIP. IEEE. 2016, pp. 577–583.
[41] R. Hunt. “PKI and digital certification infrastructure.” In: Networks, 2001. Proceed-
ings. Ninth IEEE International Conference on. IEEE. 2001, pp. 234–239.
[46] Ieee. IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography. 2000. doi: 10.1109/
IEEESTD.2000.92292. url: https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1363-
2000.html.
[42] A. A. Imem. “Comparison and evaluation of digital signature schemes employed
in NDN network.” In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1508.00184 (2015).
[43] E. International. On 17 June 2015, the 109th Ecma General Assembly approved new
editions of NFC Standards. 2015.
[44] S. Josefsson and I. Liusvaara. “Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm (Ed-
DSA).” In: Internet Research Task Force, Crypto Forum Research Group, RFC. Vol. 8032.
2017.
[45] A. Juels. “RFID security and privacy: A research survey.” In: IEEE journal on
selected areas in communications 24.2 (2006), pp. 381–394.
[47] M. Knežević, V. Nikov, and P. Rombouts. “Low-latency ECDSA signature veri-
fication—a road toward safer traffic.” In: IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems 24.11 (2016), pp. 3257–3267.
[48] B. Krebs. “Citibank Phish Spoofs 2-Factor Authentication.” In: The Washington Post
(July 10, 2006). url: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2006/
07/citibank_phish_spoofs_2factor_1.html (visited on 12/22/2018).
[49] Z. Lina. “Design and Implementation of KSP on the Next Generation Cryptography
API.” In: Physics Procedia 33 (2012), pp. 1640–1646.
92
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[50] J.-C. Liou and S. Bhashyam. “On improving feasibility and security measures of
online authentication.” In: Int. J. Adv. Comp. Techn. 2.4 (2010), pp. 6–16.
[51] A. Lonzetta, P. Cope, J. Campbell, B. Mohd, and T. Hayajneh. “Security Vulnera-
bilities in Bluetooth Technology as Used in IoT.” In: Journal of Sensor and Actuator
Networks 7.3 (2018), p. 28.
[52] A. Maetouq, S. M. Daud, N. A. Ahmad, N. Maarop, N. N. A. Sjarif, and H. Abas.
“Comparison of Hash Function Algorithms Against Attacks: A Review.” In: IN-
TERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ADVANCED COMPUTER SCIENCE AND APPLICA-
TIONS 9.8 (2018), pp. 98–103.
[53] Microsoft. Cryptography API: Next Generation. 2018. url: https://docs.microsoft.
com/en-us/windows/desktop/seccng/cng-portal (visited on 02/15/2019).
[54] Microsoft. Understanding Cryptographic Providers. 2018. url: https://docs.
microsoft . com / en - us / windows / desktop / seccertenroll / understanding -
cryptographic-providers (visited on 02/15/2019).
[55] Microsoft. Add or remove a digital signature in Office files. 2019. url: https://
support.office.com/en-us/article/add-or-remove-a-digital-signature-
in-office-files-70d26dc9-be10-46f1-8efa-719c8b3f1a2d#__toc311526848
(visited on 08/17/2019).
[56] Microsoft. Secure messages by using a digital signature. 2019. url: https : / /
support.office.com/en-us/article/secure-messages-by-using-a-digital-
signature-549ca2f1-a68f-4366-85fa-b3f4b5856fc6 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[57] Z Mngomezulu, S Rimer, K Ouahada, and A. Ndjiongue. “A review of Bluetooth
and NFC for financial applications.” In: Sixth International Conference on Advances
in Computing, Control and Networking - ACCN 2017 (2017), pp. 48–51. doi: 10.
15224/978-1-63248-117-7-11. url: https://www.seekdl.org/conferences/
paper/details/8674.
[58] K. Moriarty, B. Kaliski, J. Jonsson, and A. Rusch. PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography
Specifications Version 2.2. RFC 8017. Nov. 2016. doi: 10.17487/RFC8017. url:
https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017.txt (visited on 08/17/2019).
[59] T. Muller. “Bluetooth security architecture.” In: White Paper Version 1 (1999).
[60] T. R. Mutchukota, S. K. Panigrahy, and S. K. Jena. “Man-in-the-middle attack and
its countermeasure in bluetooth secure simple pairing.” In: Computer Networks and
Intelligent Computing. Springer, 2011, pp. 367–376.
[61] “National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standard (FIPS) 186: Digital Signature Standard (DSS).” In: Information
Technology Laboratory, NIST, Gaithersburg, MD (1994).
93
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[62] National Security Agency (NSA). The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography. 2009.
url: http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml (visited
on 08/17/2019).
[63] National Security Agency (NSA). Suite B Cryptography. 2014. url: https://www.
nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/ (visited on 08/17/2019).
[64] Near Field Communication - White Paper. Ecma/TC32-TG19/2005/012. Ecma Inter-
national. 2005.
[65] NFC-SEC, White Paper. Ecma/TC47/2008/089. Ecma International. 2008.
[66] N. Nitta, F. Wu, J. T. Lee, and G. Yushin. “Li-ion battery materials: present and
future.” In: Materials today 18.5 (2015), pp. 252–264.
[67] J. Padgette, K. Scarfone, and L. Chen. NIST Special Publication 800-121 Revision
2, Guide to Bluetooth Security. url: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-121r2.pdf.
[68] S. K. Panigrahy, S. K. Jena, and A. K. Turuk. “Security in Bluetooth, RFID and
wireless sensor networks.” In: Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on
Communication, Computing & Security. ACM. 2011, pp. 628–633.
[69] Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). ANSI X9.62. Nov. 2005.
[70] A. Rahul, G. Krishnan G, U. Krishnan H, and S. Rao. “Near Field Communication
(NFC) Technology: A Survey.” In: International Journal on Cybernetics & Informatics
4 (Apr. 2015), pp. 133–144. doi: 10.5121/ijci.2015.4213.
[71] H. Rifa-Pous and J. Herrera-Joancomartí. “Computational and energy costs of cryp-
tographic algorithms on handheld devices.” In: Future internet 3.1 (2011), pp. 31–
48.
[72] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. “A method for obtaining digital na-
tures and public-key cryptosystems.” In: Communications of the ACM 21.2 (1978),
pp. 120–126.
[73] M. Riyazuddin. “NFC: A review of the technology, applications and security.” In:
ABI research (2011).
[74] M. Roland. “Applying recent secure element relay attack scenarios to the real
world: Google Wallet Relay Attack.” In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1209.0875 (2012).
[75] M. Roland and J. Langer. “Digital signature records for the NFC data exchange
format.” In: Near Field Communication (NFC), 2010 Second International Workshop
on. IEEE. 2010, pp. 71–76.
[76] M. Roland, J. Langer, and J. Scharinger. “Security vulnerabilities of the NDEF
signature record type.” In: Near field communication (NFC), 2011 3rd International
Workshop on. IEEE. 2011, pp. 65–70.
94
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[77] M. Roland, J. Langer, and J. Scharinger. “Practical attack scenarios on secure
element-enabled mobile devices.” In: 2012 4th International Workshop on Near Field
Communication. IEEE. 2012, pp. 19–24.
[78] RSA Digital Signature Standard with PKCS #1 Scheme and SHA-based Hash Family,
OID 1.2.840.11354.1.1.11 to 1.2.840.11354.1.1.13. Global OID Reference Database,
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). url: http://oid-info.
com/get/1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[79] RSA Digital Signature Standard with Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS),
OID 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10. Global OID Reference Database, International Orga-
nization for Standardization (ISO). url: http://oid-info.com/get/1.2.840.
113549.1.1.10 (visited on 08/17/2019).
[80] S. Seys and B. Preneel. “Power consumption evaluation of efficient digital signature
schemes for low power devices.” In: WiMob’2005), IEEE International Conference
on Wireless And Mobile Computing, Networking And Communications, 2005. Vol. 1.
IEEE. 2005, pp. 79–86.
[81] SIMalliance. Secure Authentication for Mobile Internet Services - Critical Considera-
tions v1.1. 2011.
[82] SIMalliance. Secure Element Deployment & Host Card Emulation v1.0. 2014. url:
https://simalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Secure-Element-
Deployment-Host-Card-Emulation-v1.0.pdf (visited on 01/15/2019).
[83] N. Smart et al. “Algorithms, Key Size and Protocols Report (2018).” In: ECRYPT—
CSA, H2020-ICT-2014—Project 645421 (2018).
[84] S. Srinivas, D. Balfanz, E. Tiffany, F. Alliance, and A. Czeskis. “Universal 2nd factor
(U2F) overview.” In: FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard (2015), pp. 1–5.
[85] W. Stallings. Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards. 4th. Upper
Saddle River, NJ, USA: Prentice Hall Press, 2010. isbn: 0136108059, 9780136108054.
[86] M. Stevens, E. Bursztein, P. Karpman, A. Albertini, and Y. Markov. “The first
collision for full SHA-1.” In: Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer.
2017, pp. 570–596.
[87] D.-Z. Sun, Y. Mu, and W. Susilo. “Man-in-the-middle Attacks on Secure Simple
Pairing in Bluetooth Standard V5.0 and Its Countermeasure.” In: Personal Ubiqui-
tous Comput. 22.1 (Feb. 2018), pp. 55–67. issn: 1617-4909. doi: 10.1007/s00779-
017-1081-6. url: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00779-017-1081-6 (visited on
09/20/2019).
[88] J.-Z. Sun, D. Howie, A. Koivisto, and J. Sauvola. “Design, implementation, and
evaluation of Bluetooth security.” In: Wireless Lans And Home Networks: Connecting
Offices and Homes. World Scientific, 2001, pp. 121–130.
95
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[89] J. M. Tjensvold. “Comparison of the IEEE 802.11, 802.15. 1, 802.15. 4 and 802.15.
6 wireless standards.” In: IEEE: September. Vol. 18. 2007.
[90] A. Umar, K. Mayes, and K. Markantonakis. “Performance variation in host-based
card emulation compared to a hardware security element.” In: Mobile and Secure
Services (MOBISECSERV), 2015 First Conference on. IEEE. 2015, pp. 1–6.
[91] Z. Wang. “Information Security Vulnerabilities of NFC Technology and Improve-
ment Programs.” In: Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Information
Science and System. ICISS ’18. Jeju, Republic of Korea: ACM, 2018, pp. 196–
199. isbn: 978-1-4503-6421-8. doi: 10.1145/3209914.3226165. url: http:
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/3209914.3226165 (visited on 09/20/2019).
[92] Why Mobile is the Next Digital Identity. 30129-2-0216. Entrust Datacard. Jan. 2016.
url: https://www.entrust.com/wp- content/uploads/2013/08/Mobile-
Perception-vs-Reality_JAN16_WEB.pdf (visited on 12/22/2018).
[93] T. Willingham, C. Henderson, B. Kiel, M. S. Haque, and T. Atkison. “Testing Vulner-
abilities in Bluetooth Low Energy.” In: Proceedings of the ACMSE 2018 Conference.
ACMSE ’18. Richmond, Kentucky: ACM, 2018, 6:1–6:7. isbn: 978-1-4503-5696-1.
doi: 10.1145/3190645.3190693. url: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3190645.
3190693 (visited on 09/20/2019).
[94] M. Woolley. Bluetooth Technology Protecting Your Privacy. Apr. 2015. url: https:
//blog.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-technology-protecting-your-privacy
(visited on 01/23/2019).
96
